Los analistas de los 90 hablaban de la muerte del Estado. Los sucesos de S11 y la crisis financiera global parecieron darles la razón. Pero, ¿Se mantiene esta tendencia?
The New Rules: The State Strikes Back
Thomas P.M. Barnett| 04 Apr 2011
The rampant globalization meme of the 1990s was that the state would wither away, leaving nonstate actors to rule -- or ruin -- the world. The terror attacks of Sept. 11 seemed to confirm this notion, triggering all manner of academic fantasies that a proliferation of super-empowered individuals would overwhelm the world's declining and failing states. But when globalization's alleged coup de grâce arrived in the form of the 2008 global financial crisis, not only did the world not slide into widespread conflict, as so many anti-globalization hysterics predicted, but the state made quite the comeback.
Nowadays, if globalization suffers a dominant meme, it's that states and not markets rule -- Mad Max has once again been replaced by Big Brother. Paranoid conspiracy theories of "socialist-communist" plots have made a comeback, animating a new generation of American demagogues who imagine that our Cold War victory has been subversively sabotaged from within. The latest example is the just-released "Homefront" video game that posits America's rapid decline and subsequent occupation by -- get this -- a "Greater Korean Republic" led by Kim Jong Eun! All good fun until you realize how easily our young people internalize these scenarios.
Much like in the 1970s, when the West's major funk led many of our academics to project a "third way," by which communism and capitalism would "converge," we now witness serious thought-leaders -- at this year's Davos forum, for instance -- expressing genuine envy of China's state capitalism.
The irony is that, even as Washington eyes Beijing's authoritarian prerogatives longingly, China continues to move in the direction of less state capitalism and less government presence in the lives of its citizenry. Three decades ago, China's state basically controlled the entire national GDP. Today, private firms control 70 percent of GDP, account for more than 90 percent of China's 40 million-plus firms, and employ more than 90 percent of Chinese workers. They're also three times more profitable than state-run firms, averaging a 15 percent return on investment versus 4 percent for truly "red" firms.
In the industrial arena alone, where China serves as globalization's "factory floor," the pool of private-sector firms has increased 10-fold over the last decade -- approximately 25,000 to 250,000 -- while the number of state-run firms has held steady at 160,000 to 170,000. Those private-sector firms now account for two-thirds of China's industrial output and 75 percent of its industrial profits.
As economist William Baumol argued in the 2007 volume, "Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism," China is most decidedly aping the U.S. economic system. By encouraging a vast wave of small private enterprises, Beijing's technocrats hope to approximate America's hybrid mix of big, "go to market" firms surrounded by a sea of innovative start-ups -- the model most apparent in our pharmaceutical and IT industries. If China suffers a great economic weakness, most experts agree, it's not over-regulation of the economy but under-regulation, leading to such negative externalities as inefficient use of energy and water, abuse of workers, pollution and product scandals.
But even here, China surprises us with its counterintuitive answer: Rather than increase the role of the state, today's cutting-edge experiments involve getting nongovernmental organizations to step up and provide more oversight as well as other services traditionally offered by the state. This is the Shenzen model of reducing government while encouraging a "small society," in terms of its capacity to run itself, to become a "big society."
By way of contrast, government spending in the West continues to account for a rising share of GDP. Government spending among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development member states accounted for an average 43 percent of GDP at the turn of the century. Now it's 48 percent. "Socialist-communist" America actually lags behind at a mere 42 percent. But that's a startling jump from the 32 percent share we enjoyed before the "CEO government" of former President George W. Bush took the reins and, like the Reagan Republicans before him, phenomenally expanded deficit spending.
Nowadays, if globalization suffers a dominant meme, it's that states and not markets rule -- Mad Max has once again been replaced by Big Brother. Paranoid conspiracy theories of "socialist-communist" plots have made a comeback, animating a new generation of American demagogues who imagine that our Cold War victory has been subversively sabotaged from within. The latest example is the just-released "Homefront" video game that posits America's rapid decline and subsequent occupation by -- get this -- a "Greater Korean Republic" led by Kim Jong Eun! All good fun until you realize how easily our young people internalize these scenarios.
Much like in the 1970s, when the West's major funk led many of our academics to project a "third way," by which communism and capitalism would "converge," we now witness serious thought-leaders -- at this year's Davos forum, for instance -- expressing genuine envy of China's state capitalism.
The irony is that, even as Washington eyes Beijing's authoritarian prerogatives longingly, China continues to move in the direction of less state capitalism and less government presence in the lives of its citizenry. Three decades ago, China's state basically controlled the entire national GDP. Today, private firms control 70 percent of GDP, account for more than 90 percent of China's 40 million-plus firms, and employ more than 90 percent of Chinese workers. They're also three times more profitable than state-run firms, averaging a 15 percent return on investment versus 4 percent for truly "red" firms.
In the industrial arena alone, where China serves as globalization's "factory floor," the pool of private-sector firms has increased 10-fold over the last decade -- approximately 25,000 to 250,000 -- while the number of state-run firms has held steady at 160,000 to 170,000. Those private-sector firms now account for two-thirds of China's industrial output and 75 percent of its industrial profits.
As economist William Baumol argued in the 2007 volume, "Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism," China is most decidedly aping the U.S. economic system. By encouraging a vast wave of small private enterprises, Beijing's technocrats hope to approximate America's hybrid mix of big, "go to market" firms surrounded by a sea of innovative start-ups -- the model most apparent in our pharmaceutical and IT industries. If China suffers a great economic weakness, most experts agree, it's not over-regulation of the economy but under-regulation, leading to such negative externalities as inefficient use of energy and water, abuse of workers, pollution and product scandals.
But even here, China surprises us with its counterintuitive answer: Rather than increase the role of the state, today's cutting-edge experiments involve getting nongovernmental organizations to step up and provide more oversight as well as other services traditionally offered by the state. This is the Shenzen model of reducing government while encouraging a "small society," in terms of its capacity to run itself, to become a "big society."
By way of contrast, government spending in the West continues to account for a rising share of GDP. Government spending among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development member states accounted for an average 43 percent of GDP at the turn of the century. Now it's 48 percent. "Socialist-communist" America actually lags behind at a mere 42 percent. But that's a startling jump from the 32 percent share we enjoyed before the "CEO government" of former President George W. Bush took the reins and, like the Reagan Republicans before him, phenomenally expanded deficit spending.
But we can't blame it all on Bush-Cheney. While it is estimated that 30 percent of our federal government's now-gargantuan deficit is due to their policies and another 30 percent represents Obama's attempts to "fix" them, the remaining 40 percent is attributed to the growth in nondiscretionary nonsecurity spending -- otherwise known as the aging of America and the attendant health care spending crisis. Health care spending, both public and private, gobbled up another 3 percent of America's GDP across the 2000s and now encompasses roughly one of every six dollars in our economy. At this rate of growth, it will encompass our entire economy by 2065!
Naturally, with the state we're in, Americans are inundated with ambitious books by ambitious authors eager to delineate the recovery path ahead. Taken as a whole, their prescriptions seem reasonable enough: improve public education, develop alternatives to oil, simplify the tax system and reduce corporate taxes, strengthen and extend broadband IT connections, rebuild our crumbling infrastructure and keep the immigration gates open so as to continue attracting top brains and natural entrepreneurs.
Which part of that formula for renewal would lead anyone to emulate the Chinese model, I'm not quite sure. Chinese policymakers with whom I interact typically bemoan their nation's skyrocketing dependence on foreign oil and an educational system that stresses rote learning over innovative thinking. We could perhaps throw gobs of government money at "green tech" like China does, but last time I checked, government spending on innovation is short on successes and long on waste -- outside of basic research, that is.
None of this is to condone government-bashing, an activity most definitely in vogue these days. The truth of globalization has always been that the more an economy is connected to the world, the more and better government it needs. Travel anywhere these days and you will notice a clear pattern: The best places to live and work are the countries with the best government -- meaning, those that are most efficient in performing services across the growing complexity of their citizens' lives. In those countries -- see: Northern Europe -- citizens don't mind high taxes, because they see solid value returned to them.
And that would seem to be the key for the increasingly competitive and mobile world in which we live: In an age when countries are competing to land the world's best and brightest, the factors that make America more attractive to them should be our most consistent guide for self-improvement. That requires a humble attitude that allows us to seek out, recognize and copy other nations' best practices. And yes, China belongs in that mix, but not for the reasons most often mentioned.
Globalization will continue to buffet American society, but we need to avoid looking upon our government as the comforter of first and last resort. Instead, we should seek the least amount of government that effectively unleashes our population's creative energies, without which we are doomed to second-class global status.
Thomas P.M. Barnett is chief analyst at Wikistrat and a contributing editor for Esquire magazine. His latest book is "Great Powers: America and the World After Bush" (2009). His weekly WPR column, The New Rules, appears every Monday. Reach him and his blog at thomaspmbarnett.com.
Naturally, with the state we're in, Americans are inundated with ambitious books by ambitious authors eager to delineate the recovery path ahead. Taken as a whole, their prescriptions seem reasonable enough: improve public education, develop alternatives to oil, simplify the tax system and reduce corporate taxes, strengthen and extend broadband IT connections, rebuild our crumbling infrastructure and keep the immigration gates open so as to continue attracting top brains and natural entrepreneurs.
Which part of that formula for renewal would lead anyone to emulate the Chinese model, I'm not quite sure. Chinese policymakers with whom I interact typically bemoan their nation's skyrocketing dependence on foreign oil and an educational system that stresses rote learning over innovative thinking. We could perhaps throw gobs of government money at "green tech" like China does, but last time I checked, government spending on innovation is short on successes and long on waste -- outside of basic research, that is.
None of this is to condone government-bashing, an activity most definitely in vogue these days. The truth of globalization has always been that the more an economy is connected to the world, the more and better government it needs. Travel anywhere these days and you will notice a clear pattern: The best places to live and work are the countries with the best government -- meaning, those that are most efficient in performing services across the growing complexity of their citizens' lives. In those countries -- see: Northern Europe -- citizens don't mind high taxes, because they see solid value returned to them.
And that would seem to be the key for the increasingly competitive and mobile world in which we live: In an age when countries are competing to land the world's best and brightest, the factors that make America more attractive to them should be our most consistent guide for self-improvement. That requires a humble attitude that allows us to seek out, recognize and copy other nations' best practices. And yes, China belongs in that mix, but not for the reasons most often mentioned.
Globalization will continue to buffet American society, but we need to avoid looking upon our government as the comforter of first and last resort. Instead, we should seek the least amount of government that effectively unleashes our population's creative energies, without which we are doomed to second-class global status.
Thomas P.M. Barnett is chief analyst at Wikistrat and a contributing editor for Esquire magazine. His latest book is "Great Powers: America and the World After Bush" (2009). His weekly WPR column, The New Rules, appears every Monday. Reach him and his blog at thomaspmbarnett.com.
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