Un imperativo para todas las fuerzas militares modernas. Adaptarse o morir. En este artículo. Como lo hizo el Ejército Francés.
A Distant Conflict: France and the Afghanistan War.
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| Soldado francés en Afganistán. |
With the appearance in February 2007 of the French edition of his book, "The Utility of Force," the question raised by Gen. Rupert Smith became unavoidable: How can we restore the usefulness of the military force that we must still employ but that no longer seems capable of producing a politically effective result? Smith's idea of a "war among the people" began to gain a following. The French army adopted it as doctrine, resulting in new attitudes and new approaches. French doctrine positioned the population as the "center of gravity" of military action and sought to revitalize the concept of "conquering hearts and minds" -- a concept it borrowed from the Anglo-Saxon world before rediscovering its roots in France's own traditions. All of a sudden, French doctrine became infatuated with the "effects-based operations" that the country had practiced, like Molière's Monsieur Jourdain, for all this time without knowing it, but which took on a more tantalizing allure when bearing an American imprimatur. French doctrine also rediscovered the "lines of operation" and "decisive points" that Antoine-Henri Jomini had theorized, but which the French had forgotten before readopting them under their Anglo-Saxon appellations. Suddenly, the "comprehensive approach" that French generals had naturally applied without conceptualizing it during the entire period of colonial conquest was reintegrated into French doctrine under the name of "global maneuver." France rediscovered Roger Trinquier and his "Modern War," which it found burnished with a newfound interest, as well as the major works of David Galula, a French officer just brought back from oblivion in the U.S. by Petraeus, and who had never been published in his native French before 2008.
Counterinsurgency theory of all origins and nationalities was unearthed and dusted off. France sought out the most-profound understanding of "zones of action" and "involved actors," and finally grasped the importance of "actions of influence" that must take priority in planning operations.
The Military's Adaptation
Fairly quickly, through successive reinforcements, Afghanistan became France's biggest foreign military deployment, well ahead of Côte d'Ivoire and Lebanon. The manner of fighting a war changes under the pressure of the realities of the war being fought. The army, its training, its equipment and its doctrines all must adapt.
Strangely, and contrary to what took place in the United States and the United Kingdom, the French army, which bears the primary burden and suffers the most pain in what is first and foremost a land war, did not benefit from any budgetary priority, rebalancing or manpower increases. The central role of the land forces, the demand for numbers, the need to be able to hold ground -- none of these aspects of today's conflicts changed a thing. The explicit promises that had been made in the 2008 Defense White Paper were forgotten. So the army, loyal and obedient, made do with what it had and adapted to this conflict as best as it could, often to the detriment of its home-based units.
Special training facilities were created, with Canjuers in the South of France being a notable example. The concept of "differentiated training" was invented, as the army did not have the material or financial means to provide the same training to all its units.
The French military understood that tactical effectiveness in the new conflicts such as Afghanistan demands a new style of command and new competencies. Whereas the French army tended to have a tradition of centralized command, it discovered and adopted the concept of "mission command," borrowed by the British from the Germans, who had themselves borrowed it from . . . Napoleon. The army began to develop initiative at the lower command levels, understanding that this is the only way to adapt to the constantly changing conditions of the Afghan war. It discovered and taught the new tasks of warfare, those of reconstruction and aid to the people. Despite the initial reticence that met these changes, the army succeeded in getting the message across that the profession of soldier had changed and that its social dimensions now play a fuller role.
It found that war is first and foremost a matter of communication, directed toward the population in the theater of operations -- but also toward the French people, in the form of news reports. As a result, communication returned to take a central position in military training. The army realized that intelligence had also evolved. Not only were its vectors reversed, now originating principally from below to rise toward the top, but its best receptors became the soldiers themselves, who were therefore trained for this new aspect of their mission. Other indispensable skills were added as well, such as negotiation, which must be put to use in the long conversations conducted with local leaders. Ethics, which already had an important place in the French military code, now took on a central role in order to avoid as much as possible the misconduct that unfortunately was observed in other contingents.
Afghanistan also demanded that equipment be adapted. So while it had almost refused to do so previously, the French army now threw itself into what it called "reactive adaptation," so as to be able to evolve its equipment as quickly as possible as a function of the threats faced by its soldiers. The army resuscitated its procedures for what are called "operational emergencies," acquiring equipment off the shelf and modifying older models so that its soldiers might operate in the best conditions. On a parallel track, but in the same spirit, the army deployed its newest equipment, such as its Rafale aircraft, its Tiger helicopters, its César artillery, its VCBI armored troop transports and its PVP armored vehicles. In so doing, the army provided its units in the field with the necessary equipment to ensure that they enjoyed the protection, tactical mobility and precision firepower that are indispensable for success.
Conclusion
A major war cannot be without influence on the society that conducts it, unless that society has little interest in the professional soldiers waging it.
The war in Afghanistan might not be a major war, but it is certainly an important war in terms of its duration and the consequences it might have if it ends poorly for the coalition fighting it. Nevertheless, French society -- and the nation's political class -- pretends to ignore it, as if rather than being an intervention by its army on behalf of vital interests, the Afghanistan war has already become an orphaned conflict from which it would be desirable to escape as soon as possible. That might be a revealing reflection of the new relation that has established itself between the French nation and its army.
Nevertheless, the military, despite this indifference, continues to pursue a continuous adaptation -- in terms of equipment, doctrine and training -- to accomplish as successfully as possible this distant mission in which it finds itself totally engaged.
Maj. Gen. Vincent Desportes (ret.) was the commanding officer of the French Training and Doctrine Command and of the French Joint War College. He is currently the special adviser to the chairman of Panhard General Defense and teaches strategy in several French universities
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