The full motivation for China's recent incursion into Indian territory along their disputed border in eastern Kashmir is as yet unclear. But the incident brings to the fore the issue of unpredictability in Chinese foreign policy implementation and Beijing's frequent recourse to low-level aggression, often deployed to shape the backdrop to formal diplomatic negotiations. With specific regard to India, despite a general trend toward deepening cooperation, the incident lowers hopes that China's new leadership would move to clear up uncertainty in bilateral relations and create a firmer basis for cultural and economic exchange.
On April 15, in the Depsang Valley in Ladakh, eastern Kashmir, around 30 Chinese soldiers are alleged to have marched 13 miles beyond what India perceives to be the Line of Actual Control (LAC), setting up camp there for nearly three weeks. Some reports indicate that Chinese helicopters also entered Indian airspace. In Beijing, Foreign Ministry officials repeatedly denied that any violation had occurred. Coming at a time of apparent positive momentum in relations between the world's two most populous nations, the move caught most analysts by surprise and initially lacked a clear explanation.
The specific catalyst for the incursion now appears to have been Chinese objections to new infrastructure construction on the Indian side, specifically several roads and bunkers at the Daulat Beg Oldi advanced landing ground and other strategic points close to the LAC. It is not yet clear at what level on the Chinese side the order to cross the LAC was given, although the occurrence of at least three brigadier-level flag meetings in the disputed sector suggests that the impetus possibly came from local commanders.
On May 6, after the three flag meetings and reportedly intense diplomatic communication, a resolution was achieved, requiring both sides to exit the Depsang plain and Indian forces to abandon and destroy at least one bunker facility in the sector. The Chinese troops retreated as abruptly as they had advanced, their commanders apparently satisfied with Indian commitments to reduce activity around the immediate border area. As the dust settles on the incident, analysts have some opportunity to take stock.
After the recent sustained focus on the disputed Senkaku Islands, the incursion is a reminder that China is involved in multiple border disputes that are connected in a dynamic fashion. Specific flashpoints will be brought into focus at different points in time. But the key question is whether Chinese behavior should be seen within a broader strategic framework of sustained use of low-level aggression as a coercive force to help China realize its foreign policy objectives, both in the South China Sea and vis-a-vis India and Central Asia; or whether at times officials in Beijing themselves are surprised by the military’s more aggressive actions.
Beijing feels it was within its rights to discourage India from hardening its infrastructure in what it perceives as a breach of the 1962 agreement defining the LAC, and images circulated in the Indian press showed a restrained approach on China’s part. Nevertheless, the incursion adds to the roll call of Chinese uses of low-level aggression to enforce territorial claims. Given China's conventional military strength, civilian research scope and manned and unnamed aircraft capabilities, Sino-Indian relations are clouded by the latent threat of a more sustained campaign of South China Sea-type aggression carried out in the Himalayas. In recent years, China has been keen to adopt a more assertive posture on land, sea and in the airspace on its perceived territorial periphery.
Given the great geostrategic significance of the India-China-Pakistan border region, and despite accusations of weakness from some commentators, New Delhi deserves some credit for its measured diplomacy and nonescalation of the situation. Whereas incidents on the South China Sea are often met with tit-for-tat retaliation, India found a way to work within the Chinese position that the border incident had no relation to wider bilateral relations, and reports suggest intense communication between the two capitals throughout the standoff.
That communication may itself in part be due to recent cooperation in the diplomatic sphere. Despite ongoing tensions, economic cooperation between the two giants has accelerated in recent years. The potentially incendiary 50th anniversary of the 1962 conflict was constructively handled, and in March, Chinese President Xi Jinping personally endorsed a Chinese "five-point plan" to improve bilateral relations. Both sides showed pragmatism to firm up mutual diplomatic visits within 24 hours of the dispute's resolution, and it was subsequently announced that India may be open to the possibility of a Chinese industrial park in India going forward.
But despite these positive trends, the border issue is likely to remain a bone of contention with the potential to disrupt government-to-government ties. New Delhi is under domestic pressure to guard against the perceived Chinese threat, while Beijing has clearly laid down a marker of zero tolerance on continued Indian "strategic creep" in disputed areas. In reality, both sides are developing their infrastructure in the area near the LAC, meaning the potential for low-level disputes will persist, while Beijing is doing little to clear up the broader uncertainty as to how its civilian and military foreign policies intersect.
While conclusions are tentative at this stage, it is clear that other capitals and strategic planning agencies should expect China to continue or possibly accelerate its policy of sporadic use of military assets to enforce territorial claims. Such incidents will remain a major part of China's relations with key regional players and a defining feature of its power projection. To what extent this policy is endorsed by the senior civilian leadership is unclear, hindering analysis and response calculation.
The Depsang Valley incursion and the subsequent governmental response have at least shown that there is scope for a diplomatic solution with Beijing on low-level issues. How this feeds into the general evolution of China-India relations and broader perceptions of China's rise remains to be seen.
Iain Mills is an independent China analyst specializing in China’s energy and commodity markets, financial market development, political evolution and rise in Asia. His work has appeared in Asia Times, Global Times, Shanghai Business Review and Investments and Pensions Asia. He is a contributing analyst at Wikistrat and consults for several private sector firms on China strategy and investment
 |
| Los´líderes de paises que son viejos enemigos |
On April 15, in the Depsang Valley in Ladakh, eastern Kashmir, around 30 Chinese soldiers are alleged to have marched 13 miles beyond what India perceives to be the Line of Actual Control (LAC), setting up camp there for nearly three weeks. Some reports indicate that Chinese helicopters also entered Indian airspace. In Beijing, Foreign Ministry officials repeatedly denied that any violation had occurred. Coming at a time of apparent positive momentum in relations between the world's two most populous nations, the move caught most analysts by surprise and initially lacked a clear explanation.
The specific catalyst for the incursion now appears to have been Chinese objections to new infrastructure construction on the Indian side, specifically several roads and bunkers at the Daulat Beg Oldi advanced landing ground and other strategic points close to the LAC. It is not yet clear at what level on the Chinese side the order to cross the LAC was given, although the occurrence of at least three brigadier-level flag meetings in the disputed sector suggests that the impetus possibly came from local commanders.
On May 6, after the three flag meetings and reportedly intense diplomatic communication, a resolution was achieved, requiring both sides to exit the Depsang plain and Indian forces to abandon and destroy at least one bunker facility in the sector. The Chinese troops retreated as abruptly as they had advanced, their commanders apparently satisfied with Indian commitments to reduce activity around the immediate border area. As the dust settles on the incident, analysts have some opportunity to take stock.
After the recent sustained focus on the disputed Senkaku Islands, the incursion is a reminder that China is involved in multiple border disputes that are connected in a dynamic fashion. Specific flashpoints will be brought into focus at different points in time. But the key question is whether Chinese behavior should be seen within a broader strategic framework of sustained use of low-level aggression as a coercive force to help China realize its foreign policy objectives, both in the South China Sea and vis-a-vis India and Central Asia; or whether at times officials in Beijing themselves are surprised by the military’s more aggressive actions.
Beijing feels it was within its rights to discourage India from hardening its infrastructure in what it perceives as a breach of the 1962 agreement defining the LAC, and images circulated in the Indian press showed a restrained approach on China’s part. Nevertheless, the incursion adds to the roll call of Chinese uses of low-level aggression to enforce territorial claims. Given China's conventional military strength, civilian research scope and manned and unnamed aircraft capabilities, Sino-Indian relations are clouded by the latent threat of a more sustained campaign of South China Sea-type aggression carried out in the Himalayas. In recent years, China has been keen to adopt a more assertive posture on land, sea and in the airspace on its perceived territorial periphery.
Given the great geostrategic significance of the India-China-Pakistan border region, and despite accusations of weakness from some commentators, New Delhi deserves some credit for its measured diplomacy and nonescalation of the situation. Whereas incidents on the South China Sea are often met with tit-for-tat retaliation, India found a way to work within the Chinese position that the border incident had no relation to wider bilateral relations, and reports suggest intense communication between the two capitals throughout the standoff.
That communication may itself in part be due to recent cooperation in the diplomatic sphere. Despite ongoing tensions, economic cooperation between the two giants has accelerated in recent years. The potentially incendiary 50th anniversary of the 1962 conflict was constructively handled, and in March, Chinese President Xi Jinping personally endorsed a Chinese "five-point plan" to improve bilateral relations. Both sides showed pragmatism to firm up mutual diplomatic visits within 24 hours of the dispute's resolution, and it was subsequently announced that India may be open to the possibility of a Chinese industrial park in India going forward.
But despite these positive trends, the border issue is likely to remain a bone of contention with the potential to disrupt government-to-government ties. New Delhi is under domestic pressure to guard against the perceived Chinese threat, while Beijing has clearly laid down a marker of zero tolerance on continued Indian "strategic creep" in disputed areas. In reality, both sides are developing their infrastructure in the area near the LAC, meaning the potential for low-level disputes will persist, while Beijing is doing little to clear up the broader uncertainty as to how its civilian and military foreign policies intersect.
While conclusions are tentative at this stage, it is clear that other capitals and strategic planning agencies should expect China to continue or possibly accelerate its policy of sporadic use of military assets to enforce territorial claims. Such incidents will remain a major part of China's relations with key regional players and a defining feature of its power projection. To what extent this policy is endorsed by the senior civilian leadership is unclear, hindering analysis and response calculation.
The Depsang Valley incursion and the subsequent governmental response have at least shown that there is scope for a diplomatic solution with Beijing on low-level issues. How this feeds into the general evolution of China-India relations and broader perceptions of China's rise remains to be seen.
Iain Mills is an independent China analyst specializing in China’s energy and commodity markets, financial market development, political evolution and rise in Asia. His work has appeared in Asia Times, Global Times, Shanghai Business Review and Investments and Pensions Asia. He is a contributing analyst at Wikistrat and consults for several private sector firms on China strategy and investment
No hay comentarios:
Publicar un comentario