La expansión del rol de las FFEE.

No cabe duda que los conflictos modernos son el escenario ideal para las FFEE. La muerte de Osan bin Laden es solo un caso de sus capacidades. Pero, precisamente, en ello estriban los peligros relativos a su politización y a su desgaste.

Special Operations Forces' Expanding Global Role

By Andrew Exum - 30 May 12

Over the past several months, we have learned more about plans by the U.S. Special Operations Command to take on a greater role globally. As reported by Kim Dozier and others, U.S. special operations forces are working to build a global network of special operations forces in partner countries to meet a wide array of threats. U.S. special operations forces are also marketing themselves to policymakers as the “weapon of choice” after the drawdown in Afghanistan.


This push for greater prominence arrives at a time when special operations forces, long the bastard children of the U.S. military, are enjoying unprecedented prominence and esteem. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton even traveled to their headquarters in Tampa, Florida, last week to sing their praises.

For the next few weeks, though, I will be devoting a series of columns to the risks associated with a “special operationalization” of U.S. foreign policy. My intent is not to be alarmist but rather to ask hard questions from the position of someone who knows and admires U.S. special operations forces, but who also has real worries about this emerging trend in U.S. national security policy.

This initial column will lay out some of the themes I will explore in greater depth over the following weeks.

First, in the United States, no public institution is more admired than the U.S. military. And within the U.S. military, no institution is more widely admired than the elite special operations forces. Although the larger military struggled to come to terms with the conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. special operations forces have devastated al-Qaida and associated movements from Pakistan to the Philippines. While U.S. Marines were slogging through exhausting counterinsurgency operations in southern Afghanistan toward unclear ends, for example, U.S. Navy SEALs were killing pirates with sniper rifles off the coast of Somalia and killing Osama bin Laden deep in the heart of Pakistan. The attention both of these operations garnered also highlights the surprisingly high public profile that the usually secretive units have had in recent years.

Consequently, criticizing the special operations community carries risk for any elected official, especially in an election year. And even in circumstances where legislators are willing to assume some risk in asking hard questions, the dwindling number of legislators with military experience means that fewer of them now know which questions to ask. So we are unlikely to see the U.S. Congress, normally the institution that would provide oversight, effectively challenge the expanding reach of U.S. special operations forces.

Second, the raid that killed Osama bin Laden was an undoubted triumph, but it also provides a disturbing operational model for the future. Placing U.S. military units under the temporary authority of the U.S. intelligence community further removes any potential oversight of the activities of U.S. special operations forces and allows the executive branch to resist claims from the legislative branch that it is using these forces to wage war.

Americans applaud when U.S. special operations forces parachute into Somalia to rescue hostages or kill Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. And if U.S. special operations forces are participating in a steadily escalating war in Yemen, U.S. taxpayers should know about it and Congress should be asking questions. The legislative branch of the U.S. government, in particular, should be concerned by an expansion of power by the executive branch.

Third, U.S. special operations forces are not always as good as their commanders -- and the public -- believe them to be. One lesson that seems to have been drawn from the conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan is that special operations forces are better equipped and trained than general purpose forces to wage counterinsurgency campaigns. This is quite true. But we are kidding ourselves if we think that U.S. special operations forces have some kind of advanced understanding of the local environment that allows them to more skillfully manipulate grievances, alliances and tribal structures. And these activities, as much as kinetic capabilities, are critical to successful counterinsurgency.

Some U.S. special operations commanders are eager to convince policymakers that U.S. Army Special Forces, which receive some linguistic and cultural training, have such a sophisticated understanding of local dynamics in the various counterterrorism theaters where the U.S. is now engaged that they will be able to more easily intervene to weaken al-Qaida or associated movements. They may even believe this, and indeed most probably do.

But Alexander Pope’s warning that a little learning can be a dangerous thing is worth remembering. In the best-case scenario, a 25-year-old Special Forces A-team leader with six months of Arabic knows just enough to know how much he does not know. He should be as humble in his environment as a junior anthropologist approaching a new area of study. At worst, though, a little local knowledge convinces the young officer that he is Sir Richard Burton in a green beret. Such an officer could get himself, his team and U.S. policy in a world of trouble.

Before I myself enrolled in a graduate program in Middle Eastern Studies, I had the opportunity to lead U.S. Army Rangers in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The years that I spent in the U.S. special operations community were a tremendous privilege, and I left full of admiration for the men -- and, increasingly, the women -- who fill its ranks. But U.S. policymakers should be cautious about granting new authorities to their special operators. And we should all be asking hard questions about how to best utilize these forces in the future.

Andrew Exum is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and teaches a course in low-intensity conflict at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs. He blogs at Abu Muqawama. His WPR column, Abu Muqawama, appears every Wednesday.