U.S. Foreign Policy from the Founders' Perspective.
By George Friedman
Last week I
discussed how the Founding Fathers might view the American debt crisis
and the government shutdown. This week I thought it would be useful to consider
how the founders might view foreign policy. I argued that on domestic policy
they had clear principles, but unlike their ideology, those principles were
never mechanistic or inflexible. For them, principles dictated that a gentleman
pays his debts and does not casually increase his debts, the constitutional
provision that debt is sometimes necessary notwithstanding. They feared
excessive debt and abhorred nonpayment, but their principles were never
completely rigid.
Whenever there is
a discussion of the guidelines laid down by the founders for American foreign
policy, Thomas Jefferson's admonition to avoid foreign entanglements and
alliances is seen as the founding principle. That seems reasonable to me
inasmuch as George Washington expressed a similar sentiment. So while there
were some who favored France over Britain during the French Revolutionary Wars,
the main thrust of American foreign policy was neutrality. The question is: How
does this principle guide the United States now?
A
Matter of Practicality
Like all good
principles, Jefferson's call for avoiding foreign entanglements derived from
practicality. The United States was weak. It depended heavily on exports,
particularly on exports to Britain. Its navy could not guarantee the security of its sea-lanes, which were in
British hands and were contested by the French. Siding with the French against
the British would have wrecked the American economy and would have invited a
second war with Britain. On the other hand, overcommitting to Britain would
have essentially returned the United States to a British dependency.
Avoiding foreign
entanglements was a good principle when there were no other attractive
strategies. Nonetheless, it was Jefferson himself who engineered a major
intrusion into European affairs with the purchase of the Louisiana Territory
from France. Initially, Jefferson did not intend to purchase the entire
territory. He wanted to own New Orleans, which had traded hands between Spain
and France and which was the essential port for access between the Gulf of
Mexico and the Mississippi-Ohio-Missouri river system. Jefferson sensed that
Napoleon would sell New Orleans to finance his war in Europe, but he was
surprised when Napoleon countered with an offer to sell all of France's North
American holdings for $15 million. This would change the balance of power in
North America by blocking potential British ambitions, opening the Gulf route
to the Atlantic to the United States and providing the cash France needed to
wage wars.
At the time, this
was not a major action in the raging Napoleonic Wars. However, it was not an
action consistent with the principle of avoiding entanglement. The transaction
held the risk of embroiling the United States in the Napoleonic Wars, depending
on how the British reacted. In fact, a decade later, after Napoleon was
defeated, the British did turn on the United States, first by interfering with
American shipping and then, when the Americans responded, by waging war in
1812, burning Washington and trying to seize New Orleans after the war
officially ended.
Jefferson
undertook actions that entangled the United States in the affairs of others and
in dangers he may not have anticipated -- one of the major reasons for avoiding
foreign entanglements in the first place. And he did this against his own
principles.
The reason was
simple: Given the events in Europe, a unique opportunity presented itself to
seize the heartland of the North American continent. The opportunity would
redefine the United States. It carried with it risks. But the rewards were so
great that the risks had to be endured. Avoiding foreign entanglements was a
principle. It was not an ideological absolute.
Jefferson realized
that the United States already was involved in Europe's affairs by virtue of
its existence. When the Napoleonic Wars ended, France or Britain would have
held Louisiana, and the United States would have faced threats east from the
Atlantic and west from the rest of the continent. Under these circumstances, it
would struggle to survive. Therefore, being entangled already, Jefferson acted
to minimize the danger.
This is a very
different view of Jefferson's statement on avoiding foreign entanglements than
has sometimes been given. As a principle, steering clear of foreign
entanglements is desirable. But the decision on whether there will be an
entanglement is not the United States' alone. Geographic realities and other
nations' foreign policies can implicate a country in affairs it would rather
avoid. Jefferson understood that the United States could not simply ignore the
world. The world got a vote. But the principle that excessive entanglement
should be avoided was for him a guiding principle. Given the uproar over his
decision, both on constitutional and prudential grounds, not everyone agreed
that Jefferson was faithful to his principle. Looking back, however, it was
prudent.
The
Illusion of Isolationism
The U.S.
government has wrestled with this problem since World War I. The United States
intervened in the war a few weeks after the Russian czar abdicated and after
the Germans began fighting the neutral countries. The United States could not
to lose access to the Atlantic, and if Russia withdrew from the war, then
Germany could concentrate on its west. A victory there would have left Germany
in control of both Russian resources and French industry. That would have
created a threat to the United States. It tried to stay neutral, then was
forced to make a decision of how much risk it could bear. The United States
opted for war.
Isolationists in
World War II argued against involvement in Europe (they were far more open to
blocking the Japanese in China). But the argument rested on the assumption that
Germany would be blocked by the Soviets and the French. The alliance with the
Soviets and, more important, the collapse of France and the invasion of the
Soviet Union, left a very different calculation. In its most extreme form, a
Soviet defeat and a new Berlin-friendly government in Britain could have left
the Germans vastly more powerful than the United States. And with the French,
British and German fleets combined, such an alliance could have also threatened
U.S. control of the Atlantic at a time when the Japanese controlled the western
Pacific.
A similar problem
presented itself during the Cold War. In this case, the United States did not
trust the European balance of power to contain the Soviet Union. That balance
of power had failed twice, leading to alliances that brought the United States
into the affairs of others. The United States calculated that early
entanglements were less risky than later entanglements. This calculation seemed
to violate the Jeffersonian principle, but in fact, as with Louisiana, it was
prudent action within the framework of the Jeffersonian principle.
NATO appeared to
some to be a violation of the founders' view of a prudent foreign policy. I
think this misinterprets the meaning of Jefferson's and Washington's
statements. Avoiding entanglements and alliances is a principle worth
considering, but not to the point of allowing it to threaten the national
interest. Jefferson undertook the complex and dangerous purchase of Louisiana
because he thought it carried less risk than allowing the territory to remain
in European hands.
His successors
stumbled into war partly over the purchase, but Jefferson was prepared to make
prudent judgments. In the same way, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt and
Harry Truman, realizing that avoiding foreign entanglements was impossible, tried
to reduce future risk.
Louisiana, the two
world wars and the Cold War shared one thing: the risks were great enough to
warrant entanglement. All three could have ended in disaster for the United
States. The idea that the oceans would protect the United States was illusory.
If one European power dominated all of Europe, its ability to build fleets
would be extraordinary. Perhaps the United States could have matched it;
perhaps not. The dangers outweighed the benefits of blindly adhering to a
principle.
A
General Role
There is not an
existential threat to the United States today. The major threat is militant
Islamism, but as frightening as it is, it cannot destroy the United States. It
can kill large numbers of Americans. Here the Jeffersonian principle becomes
more important. There are those who say that if the United States had not
supported Israel in the West Bank or India in Kashmir, then militant Islamism
would have never been a threat. In other words, if we now, if not in the past,
avoided foreign entanglements, then there would be no threat to the United
States, and Jefferson's principles would now require disentanglement.
In my opinion the
Islamist threat does not arise from any particular relationship the United
States has had, nor does it arise from the celebration of the Islamic
principles that Islamists hold. Rather, it arises from the general role of the
United States as the leading Western country. The idea that the United States
could avoid hostility by changing its policies fails to understand that like
the dangers in 1800, the threat arises independent of U.S. action.
But militant
Islamism does not threaten the United States existentially. Therefore, the
issue is how to apply the Jeffersonian principle in this context. In my
opinion, the careful application of his principle, considering all the risks
and rewards, would tell us the following: It is impossible to completely defeat
militant Islamists militarily, but it is possible to mitigate the threat they
pose. The process of mitigation carries with it its own risks, particularly as
the United States carries out operations that don't destroy militant Islamists
but do weaken the geopolitical architecture of the Muslim world -- which is
against the interests of the United States. Caution should be exercised that
the entanglement doesn't carry risks greater than the reward.
Jefferson was
always looking at the main threat. Securing sea-lanes and securing the interior
river systems was of overwhelming importance. Other things could be ignored.
But the real challenge of the United States is defining the emerging threat and
dealing with it decisively. How much misery could have been avoided if Hitler
had been destroyed in 1936? Who knew how much misery Hitler would cause in
1936? These thoughts are clear only in hindsight.
Still, the
principle is the same. Jefferson wanted to avoid foreign entanglements except
in cases where there was substantial benefit to American national interests. He
was prepared to apply his principle differently then. The notion of avoiding
foreign entanglements must therefore be seen as a principle that, like all
well-developed principles, is far more complex than it appears. Foreign
entanglements must be avoided when the ends are trivial or unattainable. But
when we can get Louisiana, the principle of avoidance dictates involvement.
As in domestic
matters, ideology is easy. Principles are difficult. They can be stated
succinctly, but they must be applied with all due sophistication.
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