El envolvimiento de Kenia en Somalía.

 

Beyond Boundaries in East Africa.

Kenia y sus vecinos.

By Johan Bergenas, Brian Finlay | 17 Mar 2011


On July 11, 2010, bombs ripped through crowds gathered to watch the World Cup soccer final in downtown Kampala, Uganda, leaving 76 dead and 85 wounded. Al-Shabaab, a Somalia-based terrorist organization, quickly claimed responsibility, asserting that the attack was in response to Uganda's support for the African Union's U.N.-backed peacekeeping mission in Somalia. The attack constituted al-Shabaab's first major assault beyond Somalia and the deadliest in East Africa since the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings. It opened a new chapter for the region, raising the prospects of increased insecurity and regional instability, while simultaneously dealing a significant blow to prospects for economic growth and development.

Since the Kampala attacks, cross-border skirmishes and the threat of terrorist attacks by Somalia-based operatives have been an increasing concern for East Africa. In December, al-Shabaab took responsibility for the bombing of a Nairobi bus station that killed three.

The potential for terrorism in East Africa is heightened by the region's porous borders, insufficient government capacities and inadequate judicial and law-enforcement mechanisms. Although seen by many as a uniquely African challenge, the presence of disaffected Muslim groups in close proximity to the Arabian Peninsula also raises fears that terrorists could exploit weaknesses in the region to plan and launch global operations. Indeed, as terrorist groups, including al-Qaida, encounter greater operational difficulties in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan, some worry that they will shift operations to areas where responsive capacity is less robust. There is emerging evidence that this may already be occurring in Somalia.

Kenya is indicative of broader and potentially more-worrisome regional trends. At present, because of Nairobi's resource constraints, as well as the practical challenges involved in monitoring the 400-mile border with Somalia, terror groups operating in that country "can essentially enter and leave Kenya . . . to hit the country's soft targets more or less at will." Other East African countries may be at even greater risk. Ethiopia's border with Somalia is largely void of security, and Addis Ababa has in the past found itself on al-Shabaab's target list.

Terrorism in East Africa also derails prospects for economic development. Additional attacks could hinder international business investments and hold grave implications for regional tourism and, by extension, regional economic growth. As such, terrorism is both a significant security priority and a central challenge to economic development. Governments in the region have displayed a willingness to address this threat, but unfortunately, sustained progress against terrorist organizations in East Africa is challenged by an array of financial, legal and technical hurdles. Among them are insufficient counterterrorism training for police, judges and prosecutors; lack of expertise related to the drafting and adoption of relevant counterterrorism legislation; inadequate control over land borders and inadequate monitoring of maritime boundaries; poor communications infrastructure; and a lack of the requisite technology and other hardware.

The global economic downturn complicates efforts to find funding to meet these challenges. As such, a more innovative leveraging of domestic resources and international assistance is required. In addition to helping to prevent further loss of life due to terrorism, a more coordinated approach would promote greater stability throughout East Africa, combat the challenge of small-arms trafficking, provide incentives for increased regional business investment and ensure the safety of tourists.

The concept of linking responses to terrorism with development objectives in order to reduce radicalization is not new. For decades, international security analysts and governments made the case for enhanced cooperation, even while development specialists have warned against the "securitization" of development assistance. But to date, little has been done to practically link the two.

This failure has not kept governments across East Africa from working to implement more-nuanced counterterrorism strategies.

For instance, Kenyan officials have taken steps to strengthen their capacity to combat terrorism, piracy, drug trafficking and small-arms smuggling through a variety of holistic information-sharing initiatives and the joint training of enforcement officials. In support of a U.N. resolution to combat Somali piracy, Kenya has spearheaded an effort to establish a regional maritime coordination center to support a worldwide navigation and warning system for ships sailing off the coast of Somalia. It has also set up a search-and-rescue center equipped with state-of-the-art operational systems, including a Global Distress Security System.

Border-security cooperation, designed to combat organized crime and terrorism insurgencies, is also ongoing between Kenyan, Ugandan and Somali authorities. More importantly, Kenyan officials have pragmatically leveraged the link between security and development objectives even while the donor community has been slow to implement its own rhetoric. A recent development-focused project to improve roads and transportation networks between Kenya and Tanzania incorporates a one-stop border post designed to significantly shorten customs clearance times by standardizing procedures and improving the capacity of customs agencies. The initiative will facilitate a greater volume of trade, making it more efficient but also more secure.

Although funding for the border post was drawn in part from a development grant by the U.S. Agency for International Development, because of the dual-benefit security dividends, resources could have easily been drawn from international counterterrorism and nonproliferation assistance. Such a strategy would not only have freed up financial resources for other pressing regional development objectives, it would have opened the door to a security dialogue with recipient partner governments that illustrated the net benefits of hard-security cooperation.

The donor community should build upon Kenya's innovative approach to counterterrorism by using similar dual-benefit assistance to provide funds for training police, judges and prosecutors; drafting relevant legislation; and enhancing national and regional communications infrastructure, among other things. With East African states taking steps to confront the growing threat of terrorism, it is incumbent upon the developed world to provide adequate resources to struggling governments in a way that builds sustained buy-in. In doing so, donor governments can operationalize their own "whole of society" rhetoric and consciously provide assistance that resonates beyond counterterrorism. And they can do so in a way that stretches dwindling assistance dollars, while positively impacting both development objectives and good governance.

Brian Finlay is a senior associate and director of the Managing Across Boundaries program at the Stimson Center.

Johan Bergenas is a research associate with the Managing Across Boundaries program at the Stimson Center.

This article series reflects the authors' research and travel in East Africa during 2010 and 2011, which is documented in a newly released report, "Beyond Boundaries in Eastern Africa: Bridging the Security Development Divide With International Security Assistance." Elisa Valbuena-Pfau and Lovely Umayam provided research and editorial assistance.