Why did the generals decide to invade the Falklands?
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| Un Comando Anfibio argentino conduce prisioneros a los Royal Marines. |
Finally, 17 brave Argentine intellectuals have brought some sanity to the once-again agitated issue of the sovereignty of the Falkland-Malvinas archipelago. They argue quite correctly that there can be little doubt as to Argentina’s historical right to the islands. On the other hand, the 3,000 “Kelps” (as the islanders are called) are also entitled to have their rights considered. As you can imagine, the insults were not slow in coming. “Traitors”, “fifth columnists”, “mercenaries” were the mildest of the epithets.
Argentina’s rights are based solidly on the fact that the only negotiated transfer of sovereignty ever to take place on the islands was in 1767 when the French Governor Antoine de Bougainville conveyed possession to the Spanish Crown. When Argentina became independent, it acceded to all formerly Spanish lands, including the Malvinas. By then the British had already signed the Nootka Sound Convention of 1790 formally renouncing any colonial ambitions in Latin America.
Consequently, when they occupied the islands in 1833 and called it the Falklands, it was a pure act of piracy since there was no war which could justify such a grab. Argentina, busy in the 19th Century conquering its own Patagonia and becoming one of Britain’s major trading partners, had little interest in what one of its officers once called “desperate barren lands unfit for human habitation.”
Having been there twice in the past two years, I can vouch for the fact that these Kelps have created an admirable community out of these lands. Tranquil and with excellent schools, hospital, roads, housing, all based on sheep herding and now, fishing and offshore oil exploration. Their right, recognized in international law and the laws of nations, is called “self-determination.”
The question is, why, given that they had lived peacefully since 1835, did the Argentine generals decide in 1982 to invade? Two reasons will do for starters.
• Their brutally repressive regime was failing miserably at every level and they knew that agitating Argentine nationalism had always proven to be useful in such straights.
• The real border conflict was with Chile over the islands on the Beagle Channel. Control of those gave enormous advantages in terms of territorial waters and rights in Antarctica so both countries had mobilized important parts of their armed forces down to Tierra del Fuego. Knowing full well that the Chileans were no pushovers, the Argentines devised something known as the “Plan Rosario”: Take the Malvinas first and then the Beagle Islands. (See the recently released book by Juan B. Yofre, 1982: Los documentos secretos.)
The plan went tragically wrong. True, Margaret Thatcher was, “just a woman” and one facing great internal opposition at that. Nevertheless, British patriotism was engaged and the greatest armada since WW II was launched. The rest, as they say, is history. That is, until you visit the Argentine cemetery outside Port Stanley and observe the row after row of graves of over 500 Argentines, 80 percent raw conscripts, who fought bravely but were no match for the British Paras. Equally heroic was the Argentine Air Force, the one branch which had recommended moderation. Thirty seven of their pilots paid the ultimate price.
Among the consequences of the war:
First, the defeat brought down the dictatorship. Second, once Argentina agreed to have the Vatican mediate the dispute over the Beagle Channel, it was in such a debilitated state that the resulting 1985 “Treaty of Peace and Friendship” gave the islands to Chile.
And then, there is the newly revealed history of the rightwing dictators dealing directly with Fidel Castro and Gadhafi in order to secure the support of a group they had not only disdained but had done their upmost to have disappear: the left-wing members of OLAS, revolutionaries trained and controlled by Havana.
Tensions are again rising and a full-scale trade war is on the horizon. Before this goes any further, opinions such as those of the 17 Argentine intellectuals should be given a respectful hearing.
Anthony P. Maingot is professor emeritus of sociology at FIU.
Argentina’s rights are based solidly on the fact that the only negotiated transfer of sovereignty ever to take place on the islands was in 1767 when the French Governor Antoine de Bougainville conveyed possession to the Spanish Crown. When Argentina became independent, it acceded to all formerly Spanish lands, including the Malvinas. By then the British had already signed the Nootka Sound Convention of 1790 formally renouncing any colonial ambitions in Latin America.
Consequently, when they occupied the islands in 1833 and called it the Falklands, it was a pure act of piracy since there was no war which could justify such a grab. Argentina, busy in the 19th Century conquering its own Patagonia and becoming one of Britain’s major trading partners, had little interest in what one of its officers once called “desperate barren lands unfit for human habitation.”
Having been there twice in the past two years, I can vouch for the fact that these Kelps have created an admirable community out of these lands. Tranquil and with excellent schools, hospital, roads, housing, all based on sheep herding and now, fishing and offshore oil exploration. Their right, recognized in international law and the laws of nations, is called “self-determination.”
The question is, why, given that they had lived peacefully since 1835, did the Argentine generals decide in 1982 to invade? Two reasons will do for starters.
• Their brutally repressive regime was failing miserably at every level and they knew that agitating Argentine nationalism had always proven to be useful in such straights.
• The real border conflict was with Chile over the islands on the Beagle Channel. Control of those gave enormous advantages in terms of territorial waters and rights in Antarctica so both countries had mobilized important parts of their armed forces down to Tierra del Fuego. Knowing full well that the Chileans were no pushovers, the Argentines devised something known as the “Plan Rosario”: Take the Malvinas first and then the Beagle Islands. (See the recently released book by Juan B. Yofre, 1982: Los documentos secretos.)
The plan went tragically wrong. True, Margaret Thatcher was, “just a woman” and one facing great internal opposition at that. Nevertheless, British patriotism was engaged and the greatest armada since WW II was launched. The rest, as they say, is history. That is, until you visit the Argentine cemetery outside Port Stanley and observe the row after row of graves of over 500 Argentines, 80 percent raw conscripts, who fought bravely but were no match for the British Paras. Equally heroic was the Argentine Air Force, the one branch which had recommended moderation. Thirty seven of their pilots paid the ultimate price.
Among the consequences of the war:
First, the defeat brought down the dictatorship. Second, once Argentina agreed to have the Vatican mediate the dispute over the Beagle Channel, it was in such a debilitated state that the resulting 1985 “Treaty of Peace and Friendship” gave the islands to Chile.
And then, there is the newly revealed history of the rightwing dictators dealing directly with Fidel Castro and Gadhafi in order to secure the support of a group they had not only disdained but had done their upmost to have disappear: the left-wing members of OLAS, revolutionaries trained and controlled by Havana.
Tensions are again rising and a full-scale trade war is on the horizon. Before this goes any further, opinions such as those of the 17 Argentine intellectuals should be given a respectful hearing.
Anthony P. Maingot is professor emeritus of sociology at FIU.
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