To Build Future Military, U.S. First Needs Strategic Vision.
By Steven Metz, on , Column
The community of national security experts is consumed with debate on the appropriate size and configuration of the American military. Seldom does a week pass without some new report, commission or conference offering solemn advice on this complex issue. Policy journals and op-ed pages are awash with articles on it. Such vigorous discussion is a good thing, but it may be focused on the wrong issue—ultimately the size of the armed forces matters less than what they are asked to do.
There are analysts, though, who are grappling with the type of conflicts the U.S. military may be ordered to fight in the next few decades. U.S. Army Maj. Gen. H.R. McMaster recently penned a powerful essay reminding Americans of what he calls the "pipe dream of easy war," in which easy victories are "achieved by small numbers of technologically sophisticated American forces capable of launching precision strikes against enemy targets from safe distances."
McMaster always deserves serious consideration: He is one of the U.S. military's most important strategic thinkers with a profound grasp of both the technicalities of warfighting and the politics of war. His reminder that armed conflict will remain complex, dirty and protracted is important. But that alone it is not enough to drive military force and concept development. Military leaders know that the defense budget and the size of the armed forces will decline. They know that sustaining existing military capabilities will be challenging and developing new ones will be difficult and time consuming. But the challenge is identifying which capabilities to develop and which to abandon.
The problem is politics. The American political system is based on civilian control of the military. Military leaders cannot and should not develop a national strategic vision—that is the responsibility of civilian political leaders in consultation with the public. But in the current political climate, civilian leaders are unable or unwilling to articulate a long-term strategic vision. Without one, the architects of the future military must speculate about what the armed forces will be ordered to do.
The roots of this problem lie deep in history. The American political system was not designed to develop, implement and adjust a coherent national security strategy. For much of its history, the United States was an insular, inward-looking nation. The Founding Fathers and most of the political leaders who followed them did not want the United States to be a great power in the European mode. Hence they did not build the institutions or mindset to do so, settling instead for reluctant and episodic involvement outside the Western Hemisphere.
When World War II and the Cold War compelled the United States to become a great power, Americans cobbled together institutions and, importantly, the mindset needed for far-flung security commitments. This was made possible by the clear threat posed first by Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, and then by the Soviet Union manipulating global communism, anti-colonialism and the political awakening of repressed peoples. Americans argued over much of their security strategy but generally agreed that the long-term objectives and top priorities were the containment of Soviet power and the downfall of communism. When this finally happened, American strategy carried on as if by inertia, sticking with the goal of sustaining U.S. military dominance and maintaining the security system that had emerged during the Cold War.
This clarity of strategic vision shaped military force development. During the Cold War, the armed forces bought weapons systems and crafted operational methods specifically designed to counter the Soviet military and the Soviet-style militaries of "rogue states" like North Korea and Saddam Hussein's Iraq. This continued during the 1990s simply because there was no compelling reason to change. Then the Sept. 11 attacks forced a major shift in the evolutionary trajectory of the U.S. military. Defeating al-Qaida and countering terrorism and insurgency became the priorities. This was different than the earlier strategic visions but at least it was a strategic vision. So even while embroiled in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, the U.S. military had a sense of the type of future capabilities it needed.
Now the post-Sept. 11 consensus on objectives and priorities has crumbled with little sign of a new strategic vision. Neither of the major political parties has a consistent worldview that structures their positions on America's world role. Up-and-coming political leaders pay little attention to foreign and national security policy. There are few foreign and national security policy lions in Congress, and those who do exist have little interest in bipartisan consensus. As always, the White House is focused on the short-term span of electoral cycles rather than the long-term future. And it is difficult to discern coherent schools of thought within the community of foreign and national security policy experts. The result is an obsession with the crisis of the day without the working consensus needed for an effective strategic vision.
All of this leaves the military hanging. Its leaders know that they must begin now to develop the forces, systems and concepts that the armed forces will need a decade or more down the road. But without a clear idea of what Americans may want their future armed forces to do, military leaders must speculate—even guess—about the capabilities they should be building. Will the priority be containing China or undertaking force projection against Iran using high-tech weaponry? Will it be internal wars, insurgencies and humanitarian disasters? The rebuilding of shattered societies after a nuclear exchange? Cyberwar? A clash of robots? All depends on how and why the United States intends to exercise power.
Thinkers like McMaster are harvesting insights about the future of war from its past. Unfortunately, the history of U.S. national security policy does not provide a road map to its future. With luck, military leaders may guess right about armed conflict in the coming decades. But they may not. Reinvigorating a national consensus and strategic vision would help them immeasurably. They deserve it. But until some new threat emerges to focus national attention, the best military leaders can do is prepare to respond as quickly and effectively as possible once Americans decide what they want their role in the world to be.
Steven Metz is a defense analyst and the author of "Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy." His weekly WPR column, Strategic Horizons, appears every Wednesday.
There are analysts, though, who are grappling with the type of conflicts the U.S. military may be ordered to fight in the next few decades. U.S. Army Maj. Gen. H.R. McMaster recently penned a powerful essay reminding Americans of what he calls the "pipe dream of easy war," in which easy victories are "achieved by small numbers of technologically sophisticated American forces capable of launching precision strikes against enemy targets from safe distances."
McMaster always deserves serious consideration: He is one of the U.S. military's most important strategic thinkers with a profound grasp of both the technicalities of warfighting and the politics of war. His reminder that armed conflict will remain complex, dirty and protracted is important. But that alone it is not enough to drive military force and concept development. Military leaders know that the defense budget and the size of the armed forces will decline. They know that sustaining existing military capabilities will be challenging and developing new ones will be difficult and time consuming. But the challenge is identifying which capabilities to develop and which to abandon.
The problem is politics. The American political system is based on civilian control of the military. Military leaders cannot and should not develop a national strategic vision—that is the responsibility of civilian political leaders in consultation with the public. But in the current political climate, civilian leaders are unable or unwilling to articulate a long-term strategic vision. Without one, the architects of the future military must speculate about what the armed forces will be ordered to do.
The roots of this problem lie deep in history. The American political system was not designed to develop, implement and adjust a coherent national security strategy. For much of its history, the United States was an insular, inward-looking nation. The Founding Fathers and most of the political leaders who followed them did not want the United States to be a great power in the European mode. Hence they did not build the institutions or mindset to do so, settling instead for reluctant and episodic involvement outside the Western Hemisphere.
When World War II and the Cold War compelled the United States to become a great power, Americans cobbled together institutions and, importantly, the mindset needed for far-flung security commitments. This was made possible by the clear threat posed first by Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, and then by the Soviet Union manipulating global communism, anti-colonialism and the political awakening of repressed peoples. Americans argued over much of their security strategy but generally agreed that the long-term objectives and top priorities were the containment of Soviet power and the downfall of communism. When this finally happened, American strategy carried on as if by inertia, sticking with the goal of sustaining U.S. military dominance and maintaining the security system that had emerged during the Cold War.
This clarity of strategic vision shaped military force development. During the Cold War, the armed forces bought weapons systems and crafted operational methods specifically designed to counter the Soviet military and the Soviet-style militaries of "rogue states" like North Korea and Saddam Hussein's Iraq. This continued during the 1990s simply because there was no compelling reason to change. Then the Sept. 11 attacks forced a major shift in the evolutionary trajectory of the U.S. military. Defeating al-Qaida and countering terrorism and insurgency became the priorities. This was different than the earlier strategic visions but at least it was a strategic vision. So even while embroiled in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, the U.S. military had a sense of the type of future capabilities it needed.
Now the post-Sept. 11 consensus on objectives and priorities has crumbled with little sign of a new strategic vision. Neither of the major political parties has a consistent worldview that structures their positions on America's world role. Up-and-coming political leaders pay little attention to foreign and national security policy. There are few foreign and national security policy lions in Congress, and those who do exist have little interest in bipartisan consensus. As always, the White House is focused on the short-term span of electoral cycles rather than the long-term future. And it is difficult to discern coherent schools of thought within the community of foreign and national security policy experts. The result is an obsession with the crisis of the day without the working consensus needed for an effective strategic vision.
All of this leaves the military hanging. Its leaders know that they must begin now to develop the forces, systems and concepts that the armed forces will need a decade or more down the road. But without a clear idea of what Americans may want their future armed forces to do, military leaders must speculate—even guess—about the capabilities they should be building. Will the priority be containing China or undertaking force projection against Iran using high-tech weaponry? Will it be internal wars, insurgencies and humanitarian disasters? The rebuilding of shattered societies after a nuclear exchange? Cyberwar? A clash of robots? All depends on how and why the United States intends to exercise power.
Thinkers like McMaster are harvesting insights about the future of war from its past. Unfortunately, the history of U.S. national security policy does not provide a road map to its future. With luck, military leaders may guess right about armed conflict in the coming decades. But they may not. Reinvigorating a national consensus and strategic vision would help them immeasurably. They deserve it. But until some new threat emerges to focus national attention, the best military leaders can do is prepare to respond as quickly and effectively as possible once Americans decide what they want their role in the world to be.
Steven Metz is a defense analyst and the author of "Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy." His weekly WPR column, Strategic Horizons, appears every Wednesday.
No hay comentarios:
Publicar un comentario