Rusia y Arabia Saudita y la crisis del Levante.

    

 

 

Saudi Arabia Seeks Compromise with Russia Amid Mideast Upheaval

By The Editors, on 22 Aug 2013       

   

This month, Saudi Arabia reportedly offered to buy up to $15 billion worth of Russian arms if Russia would reduce its support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. In an email interview, Andrej Kreutz, an expert on Russia-Middle East relations and adjunct assistant professor at the University of Calgary, explained the recent trajectory of Russian-Saudi relations.   

WPR: What has been the trajectory of Russian-Saudi relations in the past few years?

Andrej Kreutz: Between 2003 and 2010, there was some noticeable rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Russia, which have historically had somewhat conflicting, albeit nuanced, relations. Major signs of this gradual warming in relations included the September 2003 visit of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah to Moscow and the February 2007 visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Saudi Arabia, and the reasons behind it probably included both sides’ concerns about Islamic radicalism and the Saudis’ wish to use Russia as a backdoor to Iran. Moscow, meanwhile, wanted Riyadh’s support for Russia’s policy in Chechnya and the Caucasus, and to improve its image in the Gulf and in the Islamic world as a whole.

Prince Bandar bin Sultan has travelled frequently to Moscow to negotiate with Putin and other Russian leaders, most recently meeting with Putin on July 31, 2013, and at the personal level, their relations seem to be fairly friendly. While receiving Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov in Riyadh in 2007, King Abdullah recognized Kadyrov as a legitimate Muslim ruler and expressed his government’s approval of Chechnya’s being part of the Russian Federation. Riyadh, which does sometimes act as a proxy for Washington, perhaps wanted to show some independence. Going even further, after the Russia-Georgia War in August 2008 and Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s independence, Prince Bandar reassured Putin that the Saudi government “perceived with understanding the logic of Russia’s action during the recent crisis.”

Relations between Russia and Saudi Arabia had never seemed as friendly as they were in 2009. However, they had always remained limited by the two parties’ differing interests on energy, and were subject to the fluctuating political situation in the Middle East. Shortly after the start of the Arab Spring and the ensuing outbreak of civil war in Syria, Russia and Saudi Arabia’s previous friendship was replaced by mutual accusations and hostility.

WPR: What is the logic behind the reported attempts to establish a defense relationship between the two?

Kreutz: There has been no credible confirmation about a major arms deal between Riyadh and Moscow, but it seems that both countries now want to control the explosive developments in the Middle East. Although their interests have often clashed, Saudi Arabia and Russia are both essentially conservative powers that prefer peace and stability over violent social upheavals and their unpredictable outcomes.

WPR: Where does the Russia-Saudi relationship fit into Russia’s broader approach to the Arab Spring countries?

Kreutz: There is now no ideological conflict between Moscow and Riyadh, but their political interests are often different. Neither Russia nor Saudi Arabia was pleased to see the start of the Arab Spring in 2011. However, their approaches to developments in various countries were different. In Bahrain, the Saudis had sent their armed forces to put down the uprising. Being hostile to the Baathist regime in Syria—which Riyadh saw, and still probably sees, as an illegitimate Alawite minority ruling over the Muslim people and as an ally of Saudi Arabia’s archenemy Iran—Riyadh provided the rebels with almost unlimited support. While Moscow suspected Riyadh of supporting radical Sunni Islamic forces, not only in the Middle East but even in Russia itself in the North Caucasus and elsewhere, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal accused Moscow of supporting genocide in Syria. Russia-Saudi Arabia relations thus became rocky.

Especially after events in Libya, Moscow did not want to accept Western military intervention in Syria. But the Syrian rebels’ present lack of military successes, the growth of the radical Islamist groups there and political changes in Iran have caused Riyadh to search for some form of compromise with Moscow, and Prince Bandar’s recent visit to Moscow might indicate some softening of hostility. From the Russian viewpoint, this is a positive development, but the results of Bandar’s last visit are by no means certain. Moscow could not sell out Syrian President Bashar al-Assad for Saudi money, and any other effort to find a compromise will not be easy.