¿Cuál será el rol de las Fuerzas de Autodefensa de Japón después del reciente terremoto?
Over the Horizon: A New Legacy for Japan's Defense Forces
Robert Farley | 13 Apr 2011
When the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami struck Japan on March 11, the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) coordinated and carried out the initial response to the catastrophe. For the first time ever, the ground, air and sea components of the JSDF formed a joint task force for dealing with the disaster. With the support of the United States Navy, the JSDF has assisted with relief of stricken areas and the general management of the disaster. It is no exaggeration to say that the earthquake has spurred the most significant Japanese military operations since the end of World War II.
The experience gained through this tragedy has left the Japanese military well-positioned to play an influential role in several key tasks expected to gain prominence for the world's armed forces in the future. While "hard" military tasks will remain important, opportunities for states to use their militaries for political influence extend beyond warfighting. Some of the most important missions carried out by the U.S. military in the past 10 years have involved operations other than war, most notably disaster relief in Pakistan, Southeast Asia and Haiti. The JSDF's experience with such operations gives it the potential to be an enormously influential tool of Japanese statecraft.
Political and legal objections to a heightened profile for the JSDF remain, both abroad and at home. The JSDF continues to occupy a controversial position in Japanese public opinion, although attitudes have shifted in the past decade. Following the 1995 Kobe earthquake, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama came under heavy criticism for his slow deployment of the JSDF. The Social Democratic Party was not fully comfortable with the existence of the JSDF, much less its vigorous use in domestic disaster relief. The JSDF's response following the Tohoku quake was far more vigorous, in part because of changes in the legal and political environment surrounding its use. The administration of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi represented a major shift in the Japanese governmental attitude toward military capabilities. During Koizumi's tenure, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) carried out refueling operations in the Indian Ocean for U.S. forces engaged in the Afghanistan War, while the JSDF conducted relief work in Iraq. Neither of these involved "tip of the spear" military operations, but both allowed Japanese forces to operate farther afield than they had become accustomed to since the end of World War II. Under Koizumi, Japan also pursued a more assertive foreign policy, including closer ties with the United States and a more aggressive response to North Korean provocations.
Also since Kobe, the Japanese government has undertaken several legal re-evaluations of the requirements for ordering the JSDF into action. Although Article Nine of the Japanese constitution continues to prohibit certain kinds of military operations, the legal relevance of this prohibition has been reinterpreted. These reinterpretations have not, for the most part, concentrated on questions of disaster relief. Rather, they have involved expanding the understanding of self-defense, as well as removing bureaucratic hindrances in the process of mobilizing the JSDF. Nevertheless, the restructured bureaucracy that makes possible anti-piracy operations and deployments in support of multilateral military missions also makes operations such as disaster relief easier to contemplate and execute. The JMSDF participated in relief operations following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, although not on the same scale as the United States. However, the JMSDF has increased its disaster-relief capabilities in the intervening period, and the experience gained in 2004 undoubtedly helped with the rapidity of the JSDF's response to Tohoku.
The improved experience and capabilities of the JSDF hardly make up for the damage inflicted by the Tohoku quake and tsunami. However, Japan remains in a unique position to take advantage of the growing demand for "soft power" military operations. The constitutional prohibition against offensive operations and offensive weapons creates the opportunity to focus training and procurement around non-offensive tasks. Discomfort with offensive operations also makes possible the encouragement of a military culture focused on operations other than war. Although a "pacifist military" is a contradiction in terms, military organizations can vary in terms of their comfort with "hard" and "soft" defense tasks, and Japan's is more at ease with the latter. Finally, the deployment of the JSDF in relief and peacekeeping functions fits well with an image of Japan as a good international "citizen." A well-maintained global commons benefits Japan enormously, due to its global trade profile, and the sense that Japan is doing its fair share to contribute is an easy sell to both domestic and international audiences.
As with all military organizations, the JSDF will face conflicting priorities in the future. On the one hand, the growing power of China will push Japan toward high-end military capabilities designed to fight or deter the People's Liberation Army. On the other, Japan may be inclined to take a larger role in the sort of relief operations that modern military organizations conduct regularly. This isn't necessarily an either/or proposition: The USS Kearsarge, a big-deck amphibious warship, has conducted airstrikes in Libya, while the supercarrier USS Carl Vinson assisted with relief operations off Haiti. The small aircraft carriers, or "helicopter-carrying destroyers," that Japan is currently building may someday carry F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, but they might also carry helicopters and other relief supplies for disaster-stricken Pacific islands.
Japan has two historic military legacies -- World War II and the pacifism the country has embraced ever since. Memories of World War II make the use of Japanese military power suspect from both a domestic and an international perspective. However, with the growing strength of China, Japan's military footprint seems destined to change. Nevertheless, Japan's resolute pacifism for the past 60 years may matter more for the future. With a focus on support for multilateral operations, peacekeeping and maritime maintenance, combined with its hard-earned experience at disaster relief, the Japanese military can be a "force for good," at least in the Pacific. Building on the response to Tohoku and the other operations of the last decade, the JSDF has the opportunity to create a new legacy for itself.
FUENTE: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8504/over-the-horizon-a-new-legacy-for-japans-defense-forces
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