Over the Horizon: Brazil's Global Ambitions Outstrip Its Naval Capabilities
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| Portaaviones Sao Paulo y dos Skyhawks de su dotación. |
By Robert Farley | 07 Dec 2011
In the first decade of the 20th century, Brazil attempted to stake out a space for itself as a major Western Hemisphere naval power, ordering a pair of dreadnought battleships from British yards in 1906. Dubbed Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo, these ships were as capable as any then in operation among the world’s navies, and indeed outgunned early British, German and American contemporaries. The acquisition of the two ships -- as well as the planned purchase of a third -- set off a naval race in the Southern Cone, with Chile and Argentina soon following suit. Unfortunately, the battleships were startlingly expensive, virtually bankrupting the Brazilian government. Brazil’s pursuit of regional naval hegemony ended when the poorly paid and brutalized sailors (.pdf) that made up the battleships’ crews turned their guns on Rio de Janeiro. After the revolt was quelled, the main guns of Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo were disabled, and the ships were allowed to decay over the next 40 years of intermittent service. Brazil’s first effort to declare itself a maritime power ended in expensive rust.
Today Brazil is far more prepared to engage in ambitious naval planning than it was in 1906. Its GDP exceeds that of Russia and India -- which along with China comprise the rest of the BRIC bloc -- not to mention a number of European states that have advanced fleets. Although Brazilian industry remains inexperienced when it comes to constructing modern, advanced warships, indigenous shipbuilding work over the past two decades has expanded the prospects for homegrown construction. Nevertheless, the Brazilian navy lags behind those of other comparable states. Spain, Italy, Russia and India are all developing modern, powerful platforms that make the obsolescence of the Brazilian fleet’s warships stand out in stark relief.
Navies perform several roles. They defend national interests against foreign enemies -- whether states, smugglers or pirates -- but they also help define and extend national prestige and political reach. On the former score, Brazil has few natural enemies. It is large enough to be secure against any potential South American foes, yet not powerful enough to challenge the United States. Unlike Argentina, it has no specific territorial disputes with European countries. Brazil does have offshore oil interests in the Atlantic, and there is some indication that it perceives itself to be in competition with the United States for influence in Latin America.
Brazil’s surface fleet consists of nine frigates, a third of which are obsolete by European standards. And although reports earlier this year suggested that Brazil was seeking to modernize its fleet through the purchase of six frigates from the United Kingdom, Brazil has since reined in its defense purchases due to ongoing budgetary constraints resulting from the global economic downturn.
Meanwhile, in other areas, there is little reason to believe that the Brazilians have thus far thought very seriously about pursuing a more capable fleet. Broadly speaking, the three major metrics of modern naval power are undersea warfare, naval aviation and amphibious warfare. Relatively few navies attempt to master all three; even China lacks significant naval aviation capabilities. Brazil has made a half-hearted effort at the first two, and no discernable effort at the third.
Brazil’s only aircraft carrier -- the Sao Paulo, formerly the French Foch -- entered service in 1963, and its useful service career cannot be expected to extend far into the next decade. No replacement carrier is in the works, although some have suggested Brazil might consider purchasing one of Great Britain’s new carriers, which are under order but will not be commissioned. Moreover, the Sao Paulo currently operates A-4 Skyhawks, an aircraft first flown in 1954, and the process of replacing them with a modern carrier-capable fighter has dragged on for several years. By comparison, India has purchased a Russian carrier and is building two more. Russia itself possesses a newer -- and more active -- carrier than the Sao Paulo, and regularly announces plans to build more.
The Brazilian navy’s amphibious fleet is in even worse shape. As navies around the world have updated and upgraded their amphibious flotillas, Brazil continues to rely on five very old tank-landing and dock-landing ships, acquired from the United States and the United Kingdom. Although some of the ships are capable of flying helicopters, Brazil’s amphibious armada is far below the standards of modern European or Asian navies. Amphibious warfare vessels are the maritime currency of “soft power”; they give a government the ability to claim a “piece of the action” in disasters, humanitarian crises and other nonmilitary interventions of various kinds. Though these kinds of operations are well-suited to the global image that Brazil promotes of itself, the Brazilian navy’s amphibious capabilities remain locked in what amounts to the amphibious stone age, with outmoded, obsolete vessels not even close to the international state of the art. Given Brazilian concerns about the standing up of the U.S. Navy’s Fourth Fleet, which has thus far concentrated on amphibious, humanitarian and relief operations, Brazil’s apparent disinterest in amphibious platforms is all the more curious.
The most modern and capable component of the Marinho do Brasil is its submarine force. Brazil operates five Type-209 submarines built to varying specifications in German and Brazilian yards. These boats are relatively new, with the oldest having entered service in 1989. They will be augmented over the next decade by the addition of four advanced Scorpene-class submarines built in cooperation with France, which has also agreed to provide technological assistance for a planned indigenously built nuclear attack submarine. Still, Brazil’s submarine force is smaller than its Russian or Indian counterparts. By their nature, submarines are the least visible warships, and thus the least able to contribute to enhancing national prestige and political reach. Brazil’s focus on undersea warfare suggests very limited maritime ambition.
The Brazilian navy is weak compared to the rest of the BRICs, and because of its age, the force is falling farther behind. There is nothing wrong with a nation choosing to maintain a relatively small navy. Money spent on weapons is often better spent on other priorities. The experience of 1910 is not something that Brazilians, much less Chileans and Argentinians, wish to repeat, and Brazil does not currently face any critical maritime security threat.
However, recent rhetoric from Brazil suggests an interest in playing a larger role on the global stage. And though Brazil benefits from the maritime security umbrella provided by the United States Navy, its complaints about the U.S. Fourth Fleet seem to indicate unhappiness with the U.S. Navy’s continued pre-eminence in the Western Hemisphere. The Brazilian government must choose between aligning its international expectations with the resources it is willing to dedicate to defense, or aligning its defense expenditures with its global ambitions. If Brazil does not desire to play a major maritime role, it should discard its aging carrier and forego plans for an expensive nuclear submarine, opting instead for a smaller, more compact, but more modern force. If Brazil wants to play in the same league with the other BRICs, then it needs to shift its procurement priorities soon before it gets left too far behind.
Dr. Robert Farley is an assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. His interests include national security, military doctrine and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination. His weekly WPR column, Over the Horizon, appears every Wednesday
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