El programa de misiles turco,

El rol histórico de misiles balísticos es llevar una cabeza nuclear. Pese a que pueden no hacerlo. Pero, siempre preocupa a la comunidad internacional cuando un páis busca dominar ambas tecnologías: la misilística y la nuclear. A partir del 2006, Ankara parece decidida a dominarlas a ambas.

 

Turkey's New Ballistic Missile Program Raises Eyebrows and Concerns

By Aaron Stein, on 31 Jul 2012, Briefing

Turkey’s defense procurements to date have focused heavily on defensive systems aimed at the former Soviet Union and offensive systems designed to attack the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Backed by the safety and security offered by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s collective security guarantee, as well as between 60 and 70 American tactical nuclear weapons stationed on Turkish soil, Ankara revamped its national security strategy in October 2010. In a sharp departure from the past, Ankara announced that it was removing old foes Iran, Iraq, Greece and Russia from the list of countries considered to be a threat and embarking on a more inclusive foreign policy.

While the events of the past 18 months have altered Turkey’s security situation, Ankara has not announced any changes to its 2010 defense policy. Turkey remains committed to its long-standing pursuit of defeating its Kurdish insurgency, establishing regional stability and securing economic and political influence in neighboring countries. Therefore, Turkey’s recent announcement that it intends to develop 1,500-mile medium-range ballistic missiles is a bit baffling. The missile is not useful for the fight against the PKK, nor is it entirely clear whom Ankara will aim it at.

In general, ballistic missiles have little military value due to their inaccuracy, which limits their effectiveness when carrying conventional warheads. As a result, they are primarily used for the delivery of nuclear weapons, whose large blast and devastating fallout ensure the destruction of the mission’s target. For conventional strikes, however, military planners have long demanded greater accuracy and reliability. Cruise missiles, which Turkey is also developing, have increasingly become the weapon of choice for states seeking to bolster long-range strike capabilities. They are cheaper to build, more accurate, immune to missile defenses and can be launched from a variety of different platforms. Ankara has recognized the value of these weapons, purchasing the Israeli Popeye and embarking on a program to develop indigenous short- and longer-range variants.

The historical role for ballistic missiles naturally raises concerns about Turkey’s ultimate intent, especially when paired with its ambitious nuclear plans. Since Ankara’s 2006 decision to relaunch its decades-old effort to purchase nuclear reactors, many have dubbed Turkey as the most likely state in the Middle East to pursue a nuclear capability in the event Iran develops atomic weapons. For now, however, Ankara does not appear to have made any decision to break its robust and long-standing commitment to the global nonproliferation regime. It is a member of every relevant nonproliferation instrument and appears to have conditioned future reactor sales on the delivery and removal of nuclear fuel by supplier states.

Ankara, however, is not immune to using ambitious military projects for domestic political gain. Turkey has recently announced a program to reduce the country’s dependence on foreign-supplied military equipment. The ruling AKP party campaigned on the issue during the 2011 election and has since touted the development of unmanned aerial vehicles, a trainer aircraft and a future fighter jet as symbols of technological achievement. In this context, ballistic missiles appear to be just the latest in a series of large military development projects proposed by the ruling party. These programs are part of a larger political effort designed to reaffirm Turkey’s role as a regional power, an effort that has contributed to the AKP’s popularity.

The Turkish military is also in the midst of a two-decade effort to modernize the armed forces. War planners have concluded that Turkey needs to purchase -- and then develop -- high-tech weapons and instruments to effectively wage its anti-PKK campaign. From the Turkish perspective, Ankara remains far too dependent on Washington for its intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities. The conflict in Syria, in particular the shooting down of a Turkish RF-4E reconnaissance jet last month, has exacerbated Ankara’s discomfort with the status quo. Turkey’s Syria policy has been hampered by its lack of intelligence capabilities and over-reliance on the United States for satellite imagery. However, Washington has repeatedly rebuffed Turkish requests for increased drone and satellite surveillance.

This has forced Ankara to rely on its older RF-4E’s for reconnaissance and intelligence gathering. While the details of the recent downing remain murky, the downed plane’s Israeli-updated equipment included advanced synthetic aperture radar (SAR), which is used to take detailed photograph-like images, suggesting that it was collecting intelligence. Given the airplane’s flight path, it seems probable that its mission was twofold: first, probing for weaknesses in Syrian air defenses, and second, taking SAR radar images for intelligence purposes. While manned aircraft will always be critical, Turkey would at least like to have the option to send unmanned platforms into battle areas to collect such intelligence. The downing has also led to a sticky political situation that Ankara would like to avoid in the future.

Therefore, an alternative explanation for Turkey’s ballistic missile announcement is an independent satellite launch vehicle (SLV) capability. Ankara is most likely trying to replicate the capabilities of Israel, which has used its Shavit SLV to place military satellites into low-earth orbit since the late-1980s. While Israel is not entirely independent of U.S. intelligence capabilities, it certainly has more flexibility and options than Turkey.

When viewed in the much broader context of its military development plans, Ankara’s missile plans seem significantly less ominous. However, its decision to field such a system will certainly raise questions in regional capitals about Turkey’s future military plans. A rocket capable of carrying a satellite into orbit could, with modifications, be capable of carrying a well-designed nuclear warhead. Therefore, Ankara needs to be ready for added scrutiny on its nuclear program -- and cognizant of the repercussions this announcement will have globally. Assuming the program progresses, eventual flight-testing and deployment will not be welcomed even by Ankara’s closest allies. To help combat these suspicions, Turkey should strive to be as transparent as possible and consider dropping the military component of the project, in favor of a solely civilian space program