¿Hay alguna causa que explique a la Primavera Arabe?

Desde hace un año y medio la denominada Primavera Arabe agita el Levante. Como resultado, líderes que parecían destinados a reinar de por vida, fueron expulsados, no sin antes pasar por terribles luchas internas. ¿Existe una explicación para esta serie de fenómenos?

The Realist Prism: Tracing the Roots of the Arab Spring

By Nikolas Gvosdev, on 24 Aug 2012

                 

 

For the past year and a half, the Arab Spring has convulsed the Middle East. It has resulted in the overthrow of four leaders who only two years before seemed destined to rule for life, plunged another country into a fratricidal civil war and placed even long-established monarchies under renewed political and economic stress.

What triggered this tsunami of political upheaval? And is it localized to the Arab world, or could it spread? It is no secret that authorities in Beijing and Moscow are playing close attention, attempting to ferret out any indications that a prerevolutionary situation may be building up in their own societies.


Many have cited new social media technology as a key driver of the revolutions. But these devices and the software that powers them are tools. Certainly, they helped to facilitate the uprisings -- allowing people to circumvent traditional filters used to control information and to be able to organize without having to always physical assemble -- but their mere presence was not the cause. For those in the West enamored with the prospect of Facebook revolutions, airdropping iPhones is not a democracy promotion strategy on the cheap.

Others pointed to the role of Al Jazeera in focusing attention on the uprisings; its coverage of the revolution in Tunisia, it is argued, helped to "seed" the Arab Spring in other countries of the region. A proximate cause, to be sure -- but it is also important to keep in mind that Al Jazeera has been broadcasting since 1996.

Indeed, political unrest has long simmered in the Arab world, sometimes even flaring up into open revolt, without producing the convulsions we have witnessed. Why should the Benghazi revolt have turned out any differently from other failed rebellions against Moammar Gadhafi that originated in eastern Libya over the years? Why didn't the Tahrir Square protests fizzle like earlier so-called Facebook protests that had taken place in Egypt?

Several things have changed, and it is important to look beyond the headlines to examine other root factors.

To begin with, in countries like Egypt and Libya, there were growing disputes about political succession prior to the outbreak of protests. Former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's efforts to install his son Gamal as his heir apparent aroused significant opposition from different quarters in the Egyptian power structure, especially the military. In Libya, factions had been developing around Saif al-Islam and Mutassim Gadhafi, rivals to succeed their father as leader of Libya -- and in turn, the elder Gadhafi played these factions off against each other. Elites throughout the region have been fracturing as long-established regimes begin to falter, and it was those divisions among elites that gave revolutionary uprisings a chance for success in 2011 that they had not enjoyed in previous years. Some of the defectors from Gadhafi's regime to the interim government had been associated with the more liberalizing groups that were previously associated with Saif al-Islam -- including Musa Kusa, the former foreign minister and head of Libya's external intelligence organization, who broke with the government after it decided to used armed force to repress protesters. The regimes that had fallen were not monolithic nor, at the end, were they particularly united.

Rising corruption also played a role. There comes a point at which the expected rapaciousness of a leader and his entourage reaches the breaking point. When times are good, some degree of corruption can be overlooked. But the economic crisis of the last several years did not spare these countries, especially not Egypt and Tunisia. Crony capitalism blocked opportunities for members of the middle class. As Leila Bouazizi, the sister of Mohammed Bouazizi, the Tunisian fruit vendor whose December 2010 self-immolation triggered the Arab Spring, commented, "Those with no connections and no money for bribes are humiliated and insulted and not allowed to live." In addition, all sectors of society, but particularly the poor, have been hard hit by major increases in the price of basic staples. Indeed, many have concluded that it was the astronomical rise in food prices over the last several years -- not simply the prevalence of mobile phones -- that provided the impetus for protests in Egypt, Tunisia and other areas.

The economic crisis also changed the calculations of a growing number of young, educated people who do not see any opportunity for advancement. In particular, young educated people, who felt they had nothing more to lose, were willing not simply to protest but to sustain their opposition to the old regimes in the face of initial repression conducted by the security forces. They did not choose to go home after the first incidents of violence.

This is what makes the current situation in Russia, in the aftermath of the verdict handed down in the Pussy Riot case, so interesting. The two-year sentence seems designed, in part, to send a clear message to Russia's young business class. In recent months, Russia’s young entrepreneurs have been favorably inclined toward the opposition protest movements, with some even treating it as almost fashionable. The punk band’s jailing is a signal to reconsider that support: Would they want to sacrifice the lifestyle and opportunities that they have grown accustomed to in order to take active measures against the Putin government? But that calculation only works if there is a growing economy that promises opportunity, highlighting a possible trigger for unrest in countries defined by soft authoritarian forms of governance: Any economic slowdown could produce more political unrest.

But even in more democratic systems, there are signs of brittleness. The massive power outages that plunged much of India into darkness, the ongoing labor unrest in South Africa and the growing frustration in various European countries with austerity measures are all symptoms of possible problems that could produce protest movements. One striking factor -- from Russia to the United States -- is the erosion of trust by ordinary people that current governments and politicians are capable of finding solutions. So while the Arab Spring may be unique in that actual governments are being overthrown, it seems part and parcel of a larger global trend -- the "days of shaking" -- that will be confronting regimes both autocratic and democratic all around the world.

Nikolas K. Gvosdev is the former editor of the National Interest and a frequent foreign policy commentator in both the print and broadcast media. He is currently on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect those of the Navy or the U.S. government. His weekly WPR column, The Realist Prism, appears every Friday.