Mexico’s ‘Kingpin’ Strategy Yields Little Long-Term Reduction in Violence
By The Editors, on , Global Insider
In mid-July, Mexican authorities captured Miguel Angel Trevino Morales, leader of the Zetas, a major Mexican drug trafficking organization known for its brutality. In an email interview, Brian Phillips, research professor at the Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE) in Mexico City whose research focuses on subnational political violence, discussed Mexico’s strategy of capturing or killing the leaders of drug organizations.WPR: What is the rationale behind Mexico's kingpin strategy?
Brian Phillips: Mexico focuses on arresting “kingpins,” high-level members of drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs), because it is trying to reduce the power and violence associated with these groups. The concern is not only about the flow of drugs, but the fact that the DTOs are corrupting municipal and even higher levels of government, and are essentially controlling territory in some areas. Under Felipe Calderon, president from 2006 to 2012, the government arrested or killed dozens of cartel leaders. The current president, Enrique Pena Nieto, has a somewhat different approach to the drug war, but his security forces continue to arrest leaders of DTOs. Taking down cartel leaders is supposed to weaken the groups, and therefore prevent them from being so threatening to the government and public.
WPR: What does the evidence show about the relationship between arresting kingpins and levels of violence?
Phillips: It’s unclear how arresting kingpins generally affects violence. Sometimes capturing a leader causes the group to weaken or disintegrate, but in other cases it leads to group fragmentation and then substantial intergroup violence. Most research has looked at more political groups, such as terrorists or insurgents. The most recent and methodologically rigorous of these studies find that the kingpin strategy generally works—violence usually declines after a leader of a group is captured or killed. However, terrorist and insurgent groups are different in important ways from criminal groups, as I have argued. The few studies of the kingpin strategy on DTOs show mixed results. My own study of the Mexican case finds a complex relationship: There seems to be a short-term decrease in violence after a leader is captured or killed, but in the longer term violence is unchanged or increases.
WPR: What kind of alternative policies might be effective in reducing violence in the long term?
Phillips: First, government corruption and a flawed judicial system in Mexico have permitted DTOs to acquire substantial power. Some efforts are being made to address these issues, but they probably need more emphasis. Second, the United States could play a greater role. Most drugs in Mexico are of course on their way to the United States. If U.S. demand were substantially reduced, or alternate supply sources arose, this could diminish Mexican DTOs’ income and therefore influence. The flow of guns in the opposite direction, from the U.S. to Mexico, also plays a role in cartel violence, as recent research shows. Many U.S. weapons are already in Mexico, but in the longer term both countries could work to control the cross-border movement of arms. Finally, the Mexican government will still need to face the DTOs, which profit from many activities beyond drug trafficking. One suggestion, by UCLA’s Mark Kleiman, is to focus only on the most violent groups, to send a message that the state will not tolerate violence. Overall, a careful combination of approaches could hopefully reduce DTO violence, but there is no one clear or easy path.
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