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U.S., Brazil Search for Equilibrium in an Unstable Relationship

By Eric Farnsworth, on 27 Sep 2013       

     

Brazil and the United States have long had a relationship unlike others in the Western Hemisphere. Despite some obvious similarities and important common interests, Brasilia and Washington have not traditionally shared the same worldview—perhaps they never will. As a result, policymakers are frequently left searching for an elusive equilibrium in the relationship, and casual observers can be taken by surprise when events, such as the revelations of U.S. intelligence gathering activities in Brazil, occur that highlight both the promise and also the fragility of the bilateral partnership.

Brazil is clearly a nation on the rise. Its strong democracy makes it a positive example for others in the region in the context of sound economic management that incorporates the populist characteristics of today’s Latin America. Designation as a BRIC nation in 2001 and rising trade with China gave voice and impetus to the long-standing Brazilian ambition of playing a larger role in global governance commensurate with its size. Brazil has expanded its profile in terms of international institutions such as the G-20 and the World Trade Organization, as well as across the hemisphere.

With stable politics and a growing economy, however, has come a new middle class, eager to participate more fully in the political and economic life of the nation. Expectations have risen; so too have domestic demands, as illustrated by the explosion of pent-up frustrations that began in June over the seemingly innocuous issue of bus fare increases and has grown into a months-long cri du coeur of the middle class. Compounding the issue is China’s slowing growth; anticipation of the U.S. Federal Reserve’s bond purchase taper is also hitting Brazil hard. Projections for 2013 growth are barely more than 2 percent. Investors are increasingly nervous: High-profile auctions for infrastructure concessions have been underbid, and the number of qualified bidders for the mid-October auction of the next tranche of pre-salt oil properties has attracted barely a quarter of the companies predicted.

Coupled with high-profile corruption scandals and questions surrounding the wisdom of using significant public funds in support of major sporting events, economic issues have conspired to significantly reduce public support for President Dilma Rousseff, who faces a re-election campaign in 2014.

Enter Edward Snowden and the subsequent revelations that the United States routinely gathers intelligence information on Brazil, its leaders and institutions. An incensed Rousseff, who was imprisoned and tortured under Brazil’s military regime and therefore has a visceral reaction to such intelligence gathering activities, canceled her pending state visit to Washington in October while keeping her appointment this week at the U.N. General Assembly to blast the Obama administration for its “illegal” intelligence operations. By contrast, she followed through on state visits to China and Cuba in 2012, both of whose governments know a thing or two about intelligence gathering activities, and said nothing about other spying nations such as China or Russia during her U.N. remarks.

Where do we go from here? For the moment, the bilateral agenda is essentially frozen, much to the chagrin of officials in both governments who have been actively working toward cooperation on a number of issues both political and technical.  These include topics as varied, for example, as defense sales, education exchanges, joint energy research, mutual support for research and development in Africa and, of course, intelligence-sharing activities. Not to say that they won’t continue; they will. Rather, a chill in relations at the political level always filters down to the working level, as visits are downgraded or canceled, meetings postponed and political support for aggressive pursuit of a joint agenda and momentum for deliverables wanes.

A state visit may be rescheduled at some point, and everyone will pretend that this current hiccup is forgotten. Of course, spying will continue in both directions.

But we do ourselves a disservice if we assume that the United States and Brazil are strategic partners at this stage. Hopefully, they will be some day, but they are not there yet, because Brazil continues to believe and act as if the United States is the primary brake on Brazilian ambitions, and because Brasilia often sees itself as a counterweight to Washington. A better approach for Washington would therefore be to develop a Brazil strategy that recognizes the inherent advantages of working with a prosperous, democratic Brazil both in the hemisphere and around the world, and takes concrete steps to support it, particularly in agriculture and energy, two areas where both nations are globally competitive and can learn from each other.

At the same time, as Brazil continues to pursue a position of enhanced global leadership, which implies choices and obligations, the United States and other nations of the Americas should increasingly have the right to expect that this would include support for initiatives consistent with broader Western interests. The BRIC formulation was initially meant to be merely an analytical tool, not a foreign policy framework.

To reach its political and economic ambitions, Brazil needs the United States. To achieve its own goals, the United States needs Brazil. Too bad, then, that this latest spat has intervened, setting back relations and showing the immense amount of work that both nations have yet to do.

Eric Farnsworth heads the Washington office of the Americas Society/Council of the Americas, whose Energy Action Group promotes sound energy policies for the Western Hemisphere. During the Clinton administration, he was the senior adviser to the White House special envoy for the Americas.