Las Opciones ante una Larga Guerra.

El artículo explora las cuatro alternativas que tienen los EEUU para terminar sus interveciones militares en desarrollo.

The New Rules: Four Options for Redefining the Long War



El nuevo ejército de Afganistán marchando.


Thomas P.M. Barnett | 16 May 2011

There is a profound sense of completion to be found in America's elimination of Osama bin Laden, and the circumstances surrounding his death certainly fit this frontier nation's historical habit of mounting major military operations to capture or kill super-empowered bad actors. Operation Geronimo, like most notable U.S. overseas interventions of the past quarter-century, boiled down to eliminating the one man we absolutely felt we needed to get to declare victory. Now we have the opportunity to redefine this "long war" to America's most immediate advantage. I spot four basic options, each with their own attractions and distractions.


Declare victory and go home. This is what the bulk of the American public wants, and that desire shouldn't be casually dismissed as naïve. After all, we went to Afghanistan to dismember al-Qaida's central leadership cell there, and by all accounts, we've basically accomplished that mission. Al-Qaida's headquarters staff is in permanent, off-the-grid hiding -- overwhelmingly in Pakistan. It has also been reduced to providing leadership that is more inspirational than operational in character. Tactically speaking, the network's center of gravity sits today in Yemen with al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Given the instability and proliferation risks of Libya's civil war, we must also consider al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to be of second-order importance. Staying in Afghanistan keeps us in bed with Pakistan, which means continuing to provide massive military aid to the closest thing China has as a military ally. If we're so worried about China's growing might, this path seems downright goofy. Afghanistan's run as the "good war" is officially over.

Press on maximally -- in Pakistan. Over time, this would require only a small-footprint presence in Afghanistan to facilitate cross-border strikes that will eventually get us kicked out of Pakistan anyway. The aid price tag Kabul will demand in return for allowing us to maintain bases in Afghanistan for this purpose has to be less than the $20 billion we've doled out to Pakistan since Sept. 11, the vast majority of which has been diverted to purposes other than those intended. Pakistan, for example, is on the verge of fielding tactical nuclear weapons vis-à-vis India, paid for by us! We are heading toward eventual containment of Pakistan, even as we are loath to admit it to ourselves. But with the help of the hefty intelligence haul from bin Laden's compound, we should strike at additional targets while the iron remains hot -- whatever the consequences. We can't draw down too fast in Afghanistan anyway, so President Barack Obama's instinctive preference for the aggressive use of drones, special operations hunters, CIA paramilitary teams and the like is right on the mark. If Obama's talk of sticking with Pakistan is just cover for such a maximal push, then fine. But if he's serious about lashing U.S. strategic interests to this failed and fake state, then we've just bought ourselves a West Asian version of North Korea.

Pivot toward the Arab Spring. If not for America's obsession with nuclear weapons, there would be virtually no reason for us to care about Pakistan. Indeed, for a host of reasons too obvious to list, it would make much more sense for us to side with rising India than sinking Pakistan. Meanwhile, Egypt's future path will determine much of what happens in the Arab world moving forward. We are witnessing the rebirth of a civilizational giant, and if we are going to spend nation-building funds, it should be there, not in Afghanistan-Pakistan, where other regional players are far more easily incentivized to pick up any slack we create by refocusing on the Middle East. A reasonably democratic Egypt, combined with rising Iraq and that emerging-market wunderkind Turkey, gives the region an entirely new cast. Think of the past three decades and our persistent frustrations with Palestine-Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Isn't it time to bet on some new ponies? Ten years from now, Turkey will be that much more powerful, while Iraq should be closing in on Saudi Arabia in terms of oil production, and Egypt could be doing a decent imitation of post-Sukarno Indonesia. That trio of stable democracies could be a bulwark against the inevitable nuclear brinkmanship between Israel and Iran once the latter gets the bomb -- with the Saudis likely joining in. You want a nuclear nightmare to get ready for? It's in the Middle East, not South Asia.

Pivot toward rising China. The latest National Military Strategy all but said we should forget the Middle East and focus future strategic attention on East Asia and rising China. If that is the case, why not burden China with both Afghanistan and Pakistan? The Pakistanis are trying to sell that deal right now in Kabul, so why not let them succeed and shift some of this alleged "imperial" burden to the cash-rich Chinese? Honestly, they can't do any worse than we have. By ditching Afghanistan-Pakistan, we not only tie down China a bit, but we avail ourselves of India and even give ourselves more wiggle room with Iran as it goes nuclear. That's a win all around, and given our tight finances and need for internal renewal, it's a frugal strategy to boot. We can sell arms, like we're already doing, throughout both the Persian Gulf and East Asia to hedge against Iran and China, respectively, while playing offshore balancer across Asia's southern rim, where, as Robert Kaplan cogently argues, the real "great game" is about to be played by twin risers India and China. That will be a marathon, not a sprint, to a post-2030 strategic space in which al-Qaida -- and most likely Pakistan -- will be a distant memory.

The four options fit together like a puzzle: de-emphasize Afghanistan-Pakistan and let China start paying its way more; go more virtual, light and offshore in general; pay close attention to Egypt while prepping the Middle East for the near-fireworks to come; and build a real strategic relationship with India. Once we get past the brinkmanship period with Iran, and once China starts hitting some of those inevitable developmental walls, we work on forging more realistic relationships with each.

I'm not optimistic regarding such a path, especially given President Obama's fixation on nuclear proliferation.  Instead, I expect he will tie America's fate to Pakistan's, replacing unsuccessful nation building in Afghanistan with unsuccessful nation building in Pakistan -- one of the worst strategic trades imaginable. Pakistani Chief of Staff Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani gives every indication of wanting to continue milking the U.S. for military aid while resisting the White House's demand that Islamabad finally root out the country's large network of extremist militants. This is the national security equivalent of being subjected to emotional blackmail.

The Obama administration should think long and hard before it chooses, without any genuine national debate, to assume responsibility for Pakistan's future. Iraq cost the U.S. plenty, but it was a country worth recasting, especially now that the Arab Spring has come along. Afghanistan, which has cost us less, is not worth recasting -- even if that were possible. Pakistan, though worth recasting, is arguably no more subject to such a project than Afghanistan, and the effort would cost a good deal more. A truly frugal superpower, one that's concerned about its future, would admit that and recognize the wisdom of a containment situation.

Thomas P.M. Barnett is chief analyst at Wikistrat and a contributing editor for Esquire magazine. His latest book is "Great Powers: America and the World After Bush" (2009). His weekly WPR column, The New Rules, appears every Monday. Reach him and his blog at thomaspmbarnett.com.