Un concepto principal del legado de Carl von Clausewitz es su definición
de centro de gravedad. Un concepto, muchas veces citado, pero no siempre
comprendido.
Infinity
Journal
CLAUSEWITZ
& CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS
February 2012, pages 4-7
CIausewitz´s Center of Gravity Legacy
By Antulio J. Echevarria ll[1]
This definition has some
shortcoming which unnecessarily complicate matters
Yet the
current official definition is, in fact, presented as a “modern" version
of the one found in the 1976 Howard and Paret translation of On War , in which a center of gravity is
described as the “hub of all power and movement, upon which everything
depends."[iii] Whether the updated version actually does justice to the
one Clausewitz offered is open to question. In any case, the contemporary definition
deliberately links itself to Clausewitz`s theory and thus to his conceptual
legacy, which also includes his contributions concerning the relationship
between war and policy, and the concept of friction; among other propositions.
The problem, however, is that
modern military doctrine has put more weight on the theory than it can bear
The
problem, however, is that modern military doctrine has put more weight on the
theory than it can bear. For instance, U.S. doctrine insists, as it did over
two decades ago, that identifying an opponent´s center of gravity is the
“essence of operational art" and, indeed, is the key to “all operational
design."[iv] It is not clear how any theory, least of all one so hard to
pin down, can be the essence of anything, least of all operational art.
Moreover, if doctrine is correct, then centers of gravity must be found in
order to have operational art. As there is, as yet, little consensus on the
linkages between the center of gravity and operational art, this is too great a
burden for the concept to shoulder.
On Art and Gravity
Operational art, as currently defined, is the “application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs-supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience."[v] However, the requirement to find an opponent´s center of gravity curtails creative imagination by limiting the thinking of military commanders and their staffs to one particular task. To be sure, the purpose of identifying centers of gravity is simply to assist practitioners in focusing their efforts and resources. As one former U.S. Army general explained, approaching a military problem “from the perspective of a center of gravity leads you to see very quickly that some vulnerabilities are interesting but a waste of resources because they do not lead anywhere useful in the end."[vi] However, the risk of focusing only on trying to find the center of gravity is that other, perhaps more effective, solutions will be overlooked.
Moreover, despite decades of lively debate, the validity of Clausewitz`s theory of the center of gravity has never been systematically challenged. Numerous historical case studies have examined whether or how the concept was applied in battles or campaigns. While these studies are indeed informative in many respects, they have not analyzed and tested the theory to determine its limits. In a word, the basic assumption has been that, if a concept appears in On War , it is likely valid. The only acknowledged rub has been the noted: “Planning teams can take hours-if not days-arguing over what is and is not the enemy´s center of gravity," and it is usually not evidence or analysis but rather the “strongest personality" that wins the argument.[vii] It is a bit rash, therefore, for contemporary doctrine to turn an imprecise theory into the cornerstone for operational art.
Despite decades of lively
debate' the validity of Clausewitz´s theory of the center of gravity has never
been systematically challenged
One might excuse the doctrinal assertions above as rhetorical excess but for the fact that scholars and practitioners have long taken the theory of center of gravity very seriously. For most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the center of gravity was typically thought of as the main enemy force. Broader interpretations were needed during the Cold War, and some strategists expanded the concept to include “critical aspects” of principal type of conflicts -such as continental, maritime, air, and guerilla- the control of which gave one the upper-hand.[viii]
The frequency with which the theory was mentioned rose sharply during the “American military renaissance" of the 1980s and 1990s. During those decades, the operational level of war was incorporated into U.S. military doctrine, and the concept of center of gravity became laden with institutional and service equities. Maneuver theorists, for instance, advanced an interpretation that supported their view of warfare: namely, that a center of gravity was an enemy force, a terrain feature, unit boundary, or a line of communication, which, if destroyed or neutralized, would result in dislocating the enemy either physically or psychologically. This interpretation later appeared in modified form in the operational doctrine of the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy, both of which saw centers of gravity as “sources of strength," or the “characteristics, capabilities, or localities" that enabled (or stood in the way of) mission accomplishment.
In contrast, the U.S. Marine Corps viewed centers of gravity as “critical vulnerabilities” but this interpretation also refers to a“maneuverist" mindset.[ix] For airpower theorists, centers of gravity were thought to be key nodes or critical points, which, if attacked, would cause strategic paralysis; this belief was duly approach to warfare.[x] The maneuverist and air-centric interpretations clashed, infamously, in Desert Storm with senior officers from both schools identifying different centers of gravity.[xi] Military and civilian experts in unconventional warfare kept pace, reiterating that centers of gravity in counterinsurgency campaigns were typically the “target nation´s population," - or one’s own, or a combination of the two - and U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine recently reaffirmed, stating that sustain popular support" is “usually the insurgency´s center of gravity."[xii] Other defense scholars suggested that the key might well be successful “governance operations," meaning those activities that follow major combat operations and help to link military actions to policy objectives.[xiii]
U.S. policymakers explicitly highlighted public opinion as the center of
gravity in the war on terror
In the meantime, U.S. policymakers explicitly highlighted public opinion as the center of gravity in the war on terror. [xiv] In short, the theory has both reflected and shaped not only what was important in military thinking at various times, but also what was important to military thinking during those times. The probability that it was sometimes misused merely for rhetorical impact only reinforces this point.
Clausewitz´s Theory Examined
That notwithstanding, the concept is a
vexing one, and for that Clausewitz deserves much of the blame. Although his
examples of what centers of gravity might be - such as an army, key leaders, a
capital, or an alliance - align with those discussed earlier, he did not offer
an objective methodology for identifying them. The process he described -deriving
a center or hub from an assessment of the dominant characteristics of the
belligerents- is largely intuitive in nature, which means the answer it yields
would be subjective. Clausewitz´s approach clearly harkens back to his general
theme regarding the importance of developing a commander´s military judgment.
This method, however, presumes that commanders will have developed their
judgment sufficiently before they attempt to apply the theory on the field.
Moreover, the fact that the theory was
derived from what today amounts to nothing more than elementary physics does
not always simplify matters. A center of gravity is merely a mathematical
approximation that describes the point at which gravitational forces converge
on an object. However, this simplicity is at times deceptive. Calculating the
center of gravity for complex objects, or objects in motion, is not
mathematically complicated; but it is not entirely elementary. Among other
things, the process requires accepting a certain amount of artificiality, such
as fixing objects in time and space, which then produces a sum that is valid
only for that specific situation. Such calculations are not necessarily
practical in fluid situations.
In other words, for all Clausewitz´s
foundational work hostility, and chance, he attempted to develop a concept that
reduces complex forces to a single point. Put differently, he tried to transfer
a linear, mathematical concept to a nonlinear activity, such as war -in which elements
and the relationships between them are built, destroyed, and rebuilt again but
often in different ways. This is clearly problematic, though hardly impossible.
Successive generations have taken the theory as an article of faith. lt may
indeed be worth their while to do so; nonetheless, it is prudent to manage one´s
expectations.
he tried to transfer a linear,
mathematical concept to a nonlinear activity, such as war
lt is tempting to think of a center of
gravity as a source of strength or a concentration of force, as these are
easier to identify. This is, in fact, the approach approved by contemporary
military doctrine, which is at root a capability-based formula.[xv] A recent
example is how the lSAF (international Security Assistance Force) has applied a
center of gravity framework in its efforts to help the government of
Afghanistan combat corruption.[xvi] This approach focuses on identifying the
presumed linkages between centers of gravity, critical capabilities, critical
requirements, and critical vulnerabilities (CG-CC-Cn-CV). ln brief, centers of
gravity possess critical capabilities -such as armored striking power- which
make them centers of gravity, and which, in turn, have critical requirements -such
as lines of communication- which enable them to function. The task might have
critical vulnerabilities -such as inadequately defended transportation networks-
which, if attacked, could degrade the critical capabilities of a center of
gravity, and thus degrade the center of gravity itself.[xvii]
However, the process does not necessarily
begin with identifying centers of gravity; in fact, it is not always fruitful
to begin there. Instead, the process typically starts with identifying the set
of critical capabilities that would affect mission accomplishment. These may or
may not have anything to do with the critical capabilities that belong to a
center of gravity. Yet, they should have everything to do with accomplishing
the mission, and are thus a worthwhile place for military planners to start.
Nonetheless, the distinction between a center of gravity and a “center of
critical capability," which is what military planners are actually
identifying, is an important one in order to avoid conceptual confusion.
centers of gravity ought to be thought of as focal points which' if
attacked or neutralized' would bring about the complete collapse of an opponent
he tried to transfer a linear' mathematical concept to a nonlinear activity'
such as war centers of gravity ought to be thought of as focal points which' if
attacked or neutralized' would bring about the complete collapse of an opponent
All of this is to say that operational art
does not actually need centers of gravity, per
se, though they obviously might prove useful. The method military planners
are using today, in fact, bypasses the so-called “essence" of operational
art almost entirely. The real “art" lies in translating political or
strategic aims -such as compelling the withdrawal of hostile forces, restoring
a legitimate government, assuring security and stability within a region, and
protecting American lives- into operational and tactical objectives.
Accomplishing this aim might reveal a center of gravity, if one exists. The
error lies not in believing that a center of gravity might exist in a given situation,
but in the thinking that it is always necessary to find one.
Conclusion
A rigorous examination of Clausewitz’s theory of the center of gravity
is overdue. The fact that it has not happened is due in part to Clausewitz’s
legacy. Until the limits of the theory are acknowledged, it may be useful for
military planners to keep a few caveats in mind.
First, unless the political and military aims are in line with the goal
of rendering the enemy defenseless, searching for a center of gravity is
unnecessary and possibly counterproductive. In many cases, bringing about the
complete collapse of an opponent might not serve one’s political purposes, and
could actually run counter to them.
Second, conceiving of centers of gravity as clusters of critical capabilities
is to conflate two operational concepts –while doing justice to neither.
Doctrinal precision is important in order to avoid conceptual confusion.
Accordingly, centers of gravity ought to be thought of as focal points which,
if attacked or neutralized, would bring about the complete collapse of an
opponent. They can also be thought of as the single event or activity that must
happen for success to occur, and in that sense perhaps a center of gravity
would indeed amount to the key to victory.
Were centers of gravity for AQl (al Qaeda in lraq) because its modus
operandi seemed to be to try to control the villages by first controlling
mosques -due mainly to the religious, political, and cultural power they
represent.[xviii] Denying AQl access to mosques was, thus, the logical way
forward. However, one should not rule out the possibility that multiple causes
frequently contribute to an outcome; and that it might not be obvious which
one, if any, was the most important. lt is sometimes better, therefore, to
think of an entire “set of keys" as contributing to military success (or
failure), rather than just one. ln any event, the discriminating criterion is
determining the effect that destroying, or using, a center of gravity will effect
have on one’s adversary.
Third, it is generally not fruitful to search for a center of gravity unless a telling blow on one element or part of an adversary will actually have the same effect on the rest. The system should be connected enough -whether politically, ideologically, geographically, electronically, or otherwise- to as Clausewitz wrote, is to trace all centers of power to a single one, and to focus one’s resources on attacking that.[xix] lf the situation is too chaotic or the foe is too fragmented or decentralized for that to occur, then searching for a center of gravity is unlikely to prove worthwhile.
it is generally not fruitful
to search for a center of gravity unless a telling blow on one element or part
of an adversary will actually have the same effect on the rest
Fourth, there may be situations in which striking a center of gravity might deliver a fatal blow; but the enemy might still be able to retaliate with a lethal or unacceptably damaging response, much like a spider whose legs continue to strike after it is dead. This phenomenon is what nuclear strategist Herman Kahn once referred to as “insensate war" and it is still a possibility in today’s globalized world, perhaps even more so.[xx] ln other words, the search for a center of gravity cannot be allowed to undermine intellectual creativity or to preclude the development of approaches that could enable numerous hostile elements to be struck simultaneously.
Finally, war´s fundamental nature, specifically its characteristic of uncertainty, runs counter to the level of certainty that military planners would like to have. No concept, including the center of gravity, is likely to be able to eliminate that, even if it is forced into the role of being the essence of operational art or the core of operational design. lt simply may not be possible to know beforehand with any degree of certainty whether the center of gravity has been correctly determined. Making do with uncertain concepts and principles is part and parcel of what militaries do. lt is when that uncertainty is disregarded - as seems to be the case with making the concept of center of gravity the essence of operational art - that problems arise.
Today’s militaries would do well, therefore, to ensure that those trained in identifying centers of gravity are equally educated in when not to bother.
[1] Dr. Antulio D. Echevarria ll is the Director of Research for the U.S.
Army War College (USAWC) Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He has over 20 years
experience in the U.S. Army, having served in a number of command and staff assignments,
and has held a NATO Fulbright. He is the author of “Clausewitz and Contemporary
War” among many other works. Dr. Echevarria is a graduate of the U.S. Military
Academy, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the U.S. Army War
College, and holds a Master’s and Doctorate in history from Princeton
University. He is currently on a visiting research fellowship with Oxford University’s
Changing Character of War Programme, where he is preparing a manuscript on
contested principles in contemporary war.
References:
[i] Dept. of Defense, Doctrine for Joint Operations: Joint Pub 3-0 [w/ Changes] (Washington, DC, 2011), GIossary.
[ii] James Schneider and LTC Lawrence lzzo, “CIausewitzls EIusive Center of Gravity,” Parameters 17, no. 3, (September 1987): 46-57.
[iii] CarI von CIausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. MichaeI Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University 1984), page 595. U.S. military doctrine stiII interprets the word “hub” as a “source of power,” but it also acknowledges that this meaning is not restricted to physical centers. Dept. of Army, Operations: FM 3-0 (Washington, D.C., 2008), 6-35 and 6-36.
[iv] Dept. of Army, Operations: FM 100-5 (Washington, D.C., 1986), 179-80; Dept. of Army, Operations: FM 3-0 (Washington, D.C., 2010), D-1; Joint Staff, Joint PubIication 3-0. Joint Operations (Washington, D.C., 2006), iv-12; Joint Staff, Joint PubIication 5-0. Joint OperationaI PIanning (Washington, D.C., 2006), iv-9. [v] Joint Staff, Joint PubIication 5-0. Joint OperationaI PIanning (Washington, D.C., 2011), lll-1.
[vi] BG (net.) Huba Wass de Czege, “CIausewitz: HistoricaI Theories remain Sound Compass references: The Catch ls Staying on Course,” Army 38, no. 9, (September 1988): 42.
[vii] LTC Jan L. Rueschhoff and LTC Jonathan P. Dunne, “Centers of Gravity from the `inside Out, ln Joint Force Quarterly 60, (1st Quarter 2011): 120-25. [viii] Adm. J.C. WyIie, MiIitary Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (AnnapoIis: US NavaI lnstitute, 1989<1967>), 77-78.
[ix] Marine Corps DoctrinaI PubIication 1 (Washington, D.C., 1997), 45-47.
[x] John A. Warden lll, The Air Campaign: Panning for Combat (Washington, D.C.: NDU, 1988); Dept. of Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document 1 (Washington, D.C., 1997), 79.
[xi] General Norman Schwarzkopf saw three distinct centers of gravity: Saddam Hussein; the Republican Guard; and Iraqi chemical, biological, and nuclear voI. l, 83-84. The Air Component Commander, General Charles Homer, in contrast, identified twelve center of gravity which equated to target sets ranging from national leadership and command and control to railroads, airfields, and ports. Et. At. Gulf War Air Power Survey (Washington, D.C. GPO 1993) Vol I 83-84.
[xii] A. Krepinevich, The Army in Vietnam (BaItimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1986), 9ff; FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency FieId ManuaI (Chicago and London: University of Chicago, 2007), 3-76, p. 101.
[xiii] Nadia SchadIow, “War and the Art of Governance,” Parameters 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 85-94.
[xiv] Sara Wood, “Secretary RumsfeId: U.S. Must Outdo Terrorists in Public Opinion Battle,” USA American Forces Press Service, February 18, 2006. [xv] Joint Staff, Joint Publication 5-00.1, Joint Campaign Planning (Washington, D.C., 2002), ll-6 through ll-10.
[xvi] Rueschhoff and Dunne, “Centers of Gravity from `lnside Out,lw124.
[xvii] For more detail see Joseph L. Strange and Richard lron `Center of Gravity: What CIausewitz ReaIIy Meant,” Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 2003): 20; and Joe [xviii]
[xix] Vom Kriege, Book V, Chap. 9, p. 453; Book Vl, Chap. 27, pp. 485; and On War, 810-11.
[xx] Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Praeger, 1965).
[1] Dr. Antulio d. Echevarria ll is the Director of Research for the U.S.
Army War College (USAWC) Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He has over 2O years
experience in the U.S. Army, having served in a number of command and staff assignments,
and has held a NA TO Fulbright. He is the author of “ClausewiIz and
ConIemporary War” among many other works. Dr. Echevarria is a graduate of the
U.S. Military Academy, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the
U.S. Army War College, and holds a Master’s and Doctorate in history from Princeton
University. He is currently on a visiting research fellowship with Oxford University’s
Changing Character of War Programme, where he is preparing a manuscript on contested
principles in contemporary war.
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