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The United States, emerging slowly from a financial crisis and widespread
deleveraging, is experiencing a growth slowdown, a persistent employment
problem, an adverse shift in income distribution and structural challenges, all
with little effective or decisive policy action.
Meanwhile, among the major emerging economies, China's reform process is on
hold, pending a leadership transition this fall that will clarify various
internal interests' goals and power relationships. India, which has lost reform
momentum, is experiencing an economic slowdown and a potential loss of investor
confidence.
The negative effects of these problems are now interacting, feeding back on
themselves, and spreading to the rest of the global economy. And yet, despite a
palpable sense of concern that something is very wrong, the prognosis for
significant change is bleak -- and deteriorating.
What accounts for the apparent lack of effective policy action across a broad
range of countries and regions?
One line of thinking blames a “leadership vacuum” -- a common diagnosis in
Europe. Elsewhere -- especially in the US -- polarization and ugly zero-sum
politics are thought to discourage potentially capable political leadership.
But, absent further analysis, the leadership vacuum becomes a catchall
explanation. What we need to know is why new political leadership in democracies
like France, Britain, Japan, and the US has produced so little change.
A second explanation addresses that question: While bold action is required,
the complexity of economic conditions and disagreement about the right policy
responses, implies a risk of serious error. For professional politicians and
policymakers in such circumstances, less may be more. On this view, risk
aversion both reflects and reinforces a divergence between individual incentives
(the desire to be reelected, reappointed, or promoted) and collective needs
(fixing problems).
A third answer is that policy instruments are simply ineffective in today's
conditions. There is some merit to this claim. Economic deleveraging takes time.
The restoration of sustainable patterns of growth requires years, not months.
Expectations may be out of line with the underlying reality. But the absence of
a quick solution does not mean that nothing can be done to improve the speed and
quality of recovery.
Vested interests may also play a role. Technological innovation and global
market forces have produced a decisive shift in income toward capital and the
upper 20 percent of income distribution, often at the expense of middle-income
groups, the unemployed, and the young. The beneficiaries of these trends may
have accumulated enough political influence to maintain the status quo,
highlighting distributional issues that have generally received too little
attention in understanding policy responses or their absence.
There are structural explanations for policy inaction as well. Governance
systems and constitutional structures differ in the extent to which they require
broad consensus for official action, or to change policy direction in response
to shocks or shifting conditions.
Some argue that the more constraining political systems work well in stable
times, but perform poorly under volatile conditions like those prevailing today.
Others support constrained government on the grounds that it protects everyone
from waste, rent-seeking, and interference with freedom of choice, and that,
when needed, inspired leadership can build the required consensus to address
changing circumstances. High hurdles to major shifts in policy direction force
officials to make a convincing case.
That is an inherently difficult task at a time when rapid change in the
global economy has left many still trying to understand what is happening and
what it all means for growth, stability, the distribution of income, and
employment. In the face of such complexity, it is not surprising that genuine
policy disagreements lead to extended debate and relatively little action.
Moreover, the technocratic elements of government must often be balanced
against democratic accountability. In every society, individuals with special
training and expertise are appointed to perform technically complex functions.
Their freedom of action is constrained by time limits and reappointment
procedures that determine the nature and degree of their accountability to
elected officials and the public. There can be too little freedom of action
(populism) or too little accountability (autocracy).
The necessary balance may vary according to local conditions. For example,
many China observers believe that accountability there needs to increase at this
stage of the country's economic, social, and political evolution. Others argue
that Western democracies have the opposite problem: a surfeit of narrow,
politically assertive interests leads to underinvestment and poor tradeoffs
between present and future opportunities and performance.
This brings us to a crucial obstacle: Government, business, financial, and
academic elites are not trusted. Lack of trust in elites is probably healthy at
some level, but numerous polls indicate that it is in rapid decline, which
surely increases citizens' reluctance to delegate authority to navigate an
uncertain global economic environment.
Loss of trust probably has multiple causes, including analytical failure:
central banks, regulators, market participants, rating agencies and economists
almost all failed to detect the rising systemic risk in the years preceding the
current crisis, much less to take appropriate corrective action. But a more
important cause is a suspicion that elites are placing their own interests above
shared social values.
Claims that our leadership, institutions, analyses, or policy instruments are
inadequate to the task at hand surely contain a kernel of truth. But the deeper
problem is a breakdown in precisely such values and goals -- that is, a
weakening of social cohesion. Restoring it will require analysts, policymakers,
business leaders and civil-society groups to clarify causes, share blame for
mistakes, pursue flexible solutions in which costs are shared equitably, and
most important, explain that hard problems cannot be solved overnight.
*Michael Spence, a Nobel laureate in
economics, is professor of economics at New York University's Stern School of
Business and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. His latest book is The
Next Convergence -- The Future of Economic Growth in a Multispeed World. David
Brady is deputy director and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and
professor of political science at Stanford University.(c) Project Syndicate
2012 |
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